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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) present significant risks to mine action (MA) operators and the programmes within 
which they work. Such risks can be managed through well-informed risk identification and assessment, the avoidance 
of some activities, and the procurement/development of the necessary skills, equipment and procedures to address 
others. Effective and reliable decision-making about every aspect of IEDs, at every level within a mine action programme 
(MAP), requires the support of a comprehensive, up-to-date and readily available information management system (IMS). 
In the absence of good information, and the capacity to analyse and interpret that information, MA actors run the risk 
of taking poor decisions, engaging in inappropriate activity, and putting their operational personnel at unacceptable (and 
avoidable) risk.
This study focuses primarily on improvised devices of the types that are currently encountered by MA organisations 
during humanitarian operations. The use of IEDs for terrorist purposes or as part of active conflict is not addressed in this 
study. While it is recognised that MA organisations may be present in places where there is a risk of terrorist attack, such 
events generally fall under the heading of security/law and order and are dealt with by military, security or police forces. 
The study draws especially on information relating to humanitarian IED disposal (IEDD) operations in northern Iraq, but it 
considers issues of importance to MA operators encountering improvised devices anywhere in the world.
Dealing with IEDs of any type is a serious undertaking that requires constant review and update of risk assessments 
and responses, and vigilance against complacency or assumption. Difficulties in defining the boundaries of appropriate 
operating envelopes for individual MA actors, and in assessing their level of preparedness for the demands of the tasks 
they face, means that there is uncertainty amongst managers, authorities and donors about much of the humanitarian 
IEDD work currently being undertaken.
Decisions about when it is appropriate for MA organisations to engage with IEDs, and about what types of IED they 
are equipped and competent to address, relate to the IEDD operating envelope. Only when there is a combination of 
an adequately secure environment (within which it is possible to operate in accordance with established humanitarian 
principles), and a type of IED for which the organisation has the necessary skills, equipment and procedures, is it 
appropriate to proceed. 
The IEDs that MA actors encounter are, for the most part, deployed as landmines. They may also encounter improvised 
projectiles, command wire operated IEDs and abandoned demolition charges, although typically in smaller numbers. In 
the main, devices of these types are potentially suitable – from a technical perspective – for search and clearance action 
by MA actors, if they use appropriately competent personnel and equipment, applying normal land release principles 
and using modified technical procedures. IEDs used as landmines have similar impacts (direct and indirect) to those 
associated with mass-produced, industrially manufactured landmines and are susceptible to the same land release 
methodologies employed against any other type of landmine. 
IEDs, even those locally manufactured in very large numbers, show more variations than industrially manufactured 
weapons. Different designs may be employed in different areas, and they change over time as lessons are learned 
during testing and as a result of observing the working practices and procedures of IEDD organisations. Any organisation 
engaged in IEDD operations needs access to an IMS capable of keeping up with changes in IED design and use, and 
with the ability to analyse data collected during IEDD operations to help keep operations safe, effective and efficient. 
Uncertainty about the possibility of ISIS supporters remaining hidden for extended periods in areas that have been 
recently liberated, waiting to launch delayed attacks, adds to the challenges and risks facing MA actors. While military 
and security forces have suitable capacities for such specialist work, their resources are devoted to the support of current 
military operations. These likely situations imply daily assessment by MA actors. 
Some MA operators have received requests to clear buildings. Tackling such tasks is a great deal more challenging and 
most MA actors are not equipped, in terms of personnel competence, suitable procedures or specialist tools, to engage 
in such activity. MA actors (operators and authorities) are mostly (and rightly) very wary of operations within buildings, 
although it is understood that there is pressure to respond to the humanitarian need. 
IEDs in buildings are likely to create some differences in their impacts on affected communities compared with 
landmines and other forms of explosive remnant of war (ERW); in particular, they are likely to have more direct impact 
on women, girls and boys compared with landmines and IEDs used as landmines. IEDs in built-up areas bring increased 
uncertainty about aspects of land and property title and the possibility of claims for compensation in the event of damage 
to buildings arising from IEDD operations.
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Determining the scope of appropriate, justified and necessary humanitarian IEDD activities requires a thorough, 
evidence-based approach to understanding the broader humanitarian context. Usual processes of strategic planning and 
results-based management (RBM) are wholly applicable and should be applied by authorities and operators working in 
IED-affected areas. Humanitarian IEDD operations should only be undertaken when there is a clear, verified humanitarian 
need, that cannot be addressed by other means. 
Restrictions on information sharing increase risks at every level (strategic planning, tasking, prioritisation, technical 
understanding, personnel safety, etc.) and limits the ability of operators, managers and decision-makers to identify, 
assess, evaluate and mitigate risk. Consequences range from inefficiency, through ineffectiveness, to death and injury 
amongst operators and affected populations and unnecessary damage to valuable property. 
In general terms some IEDs, under some circumstances, will be suitable for responses under the umbrella of the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Some adjustments to existing IMAS are likely to be necessary to clarify 
applicability and maintain donor, authority and operator confidence. IED types and circumstances that fall outside the 
appropriate remit of IMAS are likely to benefit from the development of suitable standards by actors working within 
the military and security sectors. The MA sector should have the opportunity to engage with non-IMAS IEDD standards 
in order to a) influence aspects relevant to MA and b) help avoid unintended consequences that could be unhelpful or 
inefficient in an MA context.
A primary area of uncertainty relates to the skills and knowledge required of IEDD operators. While there is discussion at 
the level of international standards about establishing competency requirements, there is a need, in the meantime, for 
authorities and operating organisations to document their approach to this question. Other aspects of IEDD operations 
can, and should, be managed using established quality management (QM) methods, in accordance with established 
standards.
MA has addressed similar questions of competence, suitability and appropriateness in the past, such as when the mine 
clearance sector first considered carrying out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) on items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
encountered during operations. It is reasonable to expect that a similarly practical, pragmatic and effective result will be 
forthcoming when addressing the subject of MA engagement with IEDs.
Discussion of IEDs and IEDD continues to be susceptible to confusion caused by different usages and understandings of 
acronyms and terminology by different actors and interested sectors. Action to establish standard lexicons are timely and 
likely to help improve common understanding and discussion.
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INTRODUCTION
IEDs AND HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are not an entirely new topic for the humanitarian mine action (MA) sector. Wholly 
or partly improvised weapons have been encountered by MA actors under a variety of different circumstances over 
the last 25 years, as regular military weapons have been adapted for uses other than those they were designed for, as 
improvised booby traps were combined with industrially manufactured landmines to target deminers, and as non-state 
actors (NSAs) of various types attempted to achieve their ends using whatever materials were available. 
When modern humanitarian MA started, at the end of the 1980s, landmines were readily available within international 
arms markets, or were provided to governments and anti-government elements (AGEs) during a number of civil/
internal conflicts linked to wider aspects of the cold war. Since then the anti-personnel mine ban treaty (APMBT ) has 
both stigmatised the use of anti-personnel mines (APMs) and made it much harder to obtain them. The widespread 
prevalence of IEDs used as landmines in some modern conflicts partly reflects the success of the APMBT. 
Military and security forces around the world have long experience of dealing with the improvised weapons used by 
terrorist groups. Many civilian populations, including amongst them the managers of MA organisations, have an 
awareness of such terrorist devices though their own experience of heightened security systems in their home cities, 
warning notices on public transport, images in news stories and attacks on their own countries and cities. Today’s IED 
users are associated with conflicts that bring widespread insecurity, the readiness of some parties to attack civilian 
targets far removed from the country where the main conflict nominally takes place, and the use of news and social 
media to raise awareness of the conduct, practice and underlying hatreds associated with this type of fighting. 
As a result, there is a temptation to see IEDs as something new to MA; something that demands a completely new and 
different set of responses from those previously adopted by MA. This study will suggest that such an attitude would be 
misplaced. IEDs are not exclusively used as terrorist bombs. They can also perform functions similar to those associated 
with landmines, mortars and other weapons normally associated with conventional warfare. There are differences in the 
nature and conduct of operations in northern Iraq today, compared to some MA operations elsewhere, but then there 
are also differences between MA in Afghanistan in 1991 and Bosnia in 2016, or between MA in Cambodia and that in 
Lebanon , or between dealing with individual unexploded mortar rounds on an old battlefield and processing a stockpile 
of abandoned surface-to-air missiles. 
MA has always had to respond to new and changing circumstances; it has always had to take decisions about when it 
is safe and appropriate to engage with a humanitarian issue; and it has always had to decide how (and whether) to deal 
with different types of weapon, from the simplest to the most complex.
MINE ACTION SECTOR ENGAGEMENT WITH IEDs
The topic of how (and whether) to respond to IEDs has been one of concern to the MA sector for several years. Initial 
discussions tended towards a view that the issue was one that should not be addressed at all, in direct practical 
terms, by MA actors. While the situation was perceived to be one in which IEDs were predominantly used as offensive 
weapons, during ongoing conflicts, most actors accepted that view. 
More recently, developing circumstances have prompted a change of attitude among a number of humanitarian actors, 
including international institutions, national authorities and operating organisations. This has been the case in parts of Iraq 
and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG ) area, as ISIS has been driven out of areas previously under their control, 
leaving behind widespread IED contamination in rural and urban areas with a clear humanitarian impact. As a result, 
some aspects of the question of whether the humanitarian sector should engage with IEDs have been overtaken by 
events – mine action non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and commercial companies are already clearing IEDs.
THE STUDY
A good deal of uncertainty continues to surround the issue of humanitarian IED disposal (IEDD). The Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has received requests from national authorities and international institutions 
for support and advice as they decide how to respond to IED contamination. In the face of an overwhelming humanitarian 
imperative to take action, there is now a pressing need for the MA sector to agree on how it defines and describes 
IEDs and IEDD, how it determines the limits of justified and achievable operations and how it takes decisions about 
prioritisation and tasking of IEDD operations.
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This study does not pretend to be able to answer every question, but it does aim to identify both underlying principles 
and some issues of detail, to assist informed discussion about the implications of IEDD for MA actors, and to provide 
guidance on relevant best practice. 
The study draws on existing military experience and terminology, wherever it is appropriate to do so, but it is written 
from the perspective of mine action , considering the needs, constraints, capabilities (and gaps) facing an MA actor 
engaged in IEDD operations. It reflects:
 • discussions with organisations involved in work in Iraq that brings them into contact with IEDs, or that are 
affected by the impact of IEDs;
 • existing reference documentation;
 • experience gained by military organisations; and 
 • aspects of existing MA standards, methodologies and approaches.
The study offers suggestions on appropriate practice, policies and limitations associated with mine action engagement 
in IEDD operations. It does not constitute formal direction on the subject, nor does it mirror any of the functions of a 
Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) or International Mine Action Standard (IMAS ). Responsibility for the development 
of policies towards IEDD and appropriate practical procedures remains with individual operating organisations. 
TERMINOLOGY
Language is powerful and enabling when used with precision; it has an equal potential to confuse and confound when it 
is used poorly. Shortcomings in available language bring problems at every level of discussions about IEDs, and generate 
a real risk that different actors have different assumptions and perceptions of what is meant by the many acronyms and 
terms. At the very least, such confusion results in inefficiency, but in the context of IEDs it may also lead to accidents, 
delays, reluctance to fund some activities that may in fact be appropriate, and the possibility of funding others that aren’t.
The term IED is a broad one, much as explosive remnants of war (ERW ), unexploded ordnance (UXO), or abandoned 
explosive ordnance (AXO ) are broad terms – useful for general discussions, but often inappropriate, and sometimes 
positively unhelpful, when trying to address more focused questions. In the same way that it is normal to refer to an 
unexploded mortar round, or an unexploded grenade , so it is often useful to recognise and differentiate between an 
improvised landmine (ILM), an improvised mortar round and a suicide IED.
The importance of standard terminologies is well recognised in all professional activities. Military and security 
organisations have been addressing IEDs for several decades and have developed a wide lexicon of terminology, but 
one that reflects the perspectives and concerns of military and security organisations. While much of that terminology is 
transferable to MA, the fit is not an exact one, and different organisations, and the individuals within them, may draw on 
different personal histories, gained with different military and security forces, to overlay slightly different understandings 
on similar terms.
A number of attempts have been made to standardise terminology relating to improvised weapons, the most significant 
of which for this study are the Coalition Joint Force C-IED EOD Defeat Course Lexicon version 1.4 dated 21 May 2016 and 
the UNMAS Improvised Explosive Device Lexicon dated 18 July 2016. In the mine action sector there is also IMAS 04.10 
Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations, a document that is updated whenever new terminology 
becomes significant for the sector, or when there is collective agreement that a definition needs adjustment to reflect 
changes in methodologies or understanding.
DEFINING AND DESCRIBING IEDs
Defining IEDs
The UNMAS Lexicon defines an IED as ”a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, 
lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may 
incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components”1.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines ‘improvised’ as “Invented, created, or done spontaneously or on the spur 
of the moment, esp. as a result of necessity; impromptu; and made or created using whatever is available”.2
1  United Nations Mine Action Service Improvised Explosive Device Lexicon , General Terms, Page 1.
2  http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/92883?redirectedFrom=improvised#eid 
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It is clear that relatively few IEDs, of the sorts that mine action actors are mostly encountering in Iraq, have been created 
‘spontaneously or on the spur of the moment’. On the contrary, many are the result of careful design and development 
over time, and reflect a number of iterations as lessons are learnt from successful and unsuccessful operational use. 
Similarly, while the idea of IEDs being made of ‘whatever is available’ may sometimes be the case, on many others an 
extensive procurement network is used to obtain, transport and process components for use in a manufacturing system 
on an industrial scale. Other terms (that have been used in the military context) such as locally manufactured munition 
(LMM ) may be more suitable than IED on some occasions.
Differentiating between types of IED
Within the umbrella term ‘IED’ there lies a wide variety of devices, of different sizes, purposes, construction, 
sophistication, complexity, life-span and emplacement (again much as with UXO and ERW ). Existing military terminology 
classifies IEDs under five main categories:
 • Time delay;
 • Command;
 • Victim operated;
 • Projected; and
 • Suicide.
The MA sector naturally focuses first on devices that fall under the heading of victim operated IED (VOIED ), although 
they may encounter other types as well. VOIED is another broad term encompassing devices a lot like landmines, laid 
in open country, as well as the most complex devices, with multiple different switches, concealed in buildings, objects, 
possessions and vehicles.
The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA ) is clear that the need to be able to classify IEDs is very important 
for the regional programme, in much the same way that the classification of UXO and other ERW items is essential 
for determining explosive ordnance disposal (EOD ) competency requirements, developing training programmes and 
procedures, and applying effective quality and safety management processes.3 A number of operating organisations 
highlighted the potential value of the term improvised landmine (ILM ) to help differentiate between types of IED.4
Being able to describe and characterise weapons that are encountered during field operations is essential for a range 
of strategic, planning and technical decision-making processes. Mine action operations typically do so by identifying 
manufactured munitions by type and designation. Improvised, or partly improvised, weapons do not generally offer such 
a convenient shorthand means of identification. Lexicons offer other ways of identifying and capturing key aspects of the 
design and use of improvised weapons, and can be combined with more familiar terminology (mine, mortar, charge, etc.) 
to provide useful descriptions of what is found.
THE IEDD OPERATING ENVELOPE
The concept of the operating envelope is an important one. It helps characterise situations and identify when, where and 
what it is appropriate for organisations to go and do. For the purposes of this study the basic tool used to describe the 
operating envelope is the technical/contextual complexity chart (Figure 1). 
Other approaches may be equally valid or useful; it is not suggested that this approach is uniquely suitable or should 
be adopted as the standard method, but is has been found to be helpful in providing a framework for discussion and 
analysis while preparing this study report. In this analysis the operating envelope reflects:
 • The technical complexity of the IED; and
 • The prevailing contextual complexity including the security situation.
3  Meeting with IKMAA 28th August 2016.
4  This point was raised by representatives from several NGOs during the study kick-off meeting at the iMMAP offices in Erbil – 29th August 2016. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the current perception of the extent of the operating envelope for different groups of actors working 
in northern Iraq.5
 • Military, security and Peshmerga IED capabilities address the most complex technical devices under the most 
insecure conditions, including during active military operations;
 • Commercially contracted service providers (Janus Global Operations (JGO) and Optima in Iraq) work in areas that 
continue to show some insecurity (such as the possibility of snipers, radio controlled IED (RCIED) initiators or 
indirect fire) and may deal with devices that present some higher technical challenges; and
 • Mine action NGOs work in areas that are generally more secure, against IEDs that are relatively less complex 
(although still showing greater complexity than is common in traditional mine action ). 
While the diagram is essentially illustrative – boundaries between zones on the chart are blurred and will change with 
time – it does reflect some important aspects of IEDD operations. Different actors within one zone appear to accept 
different circumstances (Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD) appears to be prepared to work in closer proximity to 
front line areas than Mines Advisory Group (MAG) for instance).6 It is of note that currently no IEDD assets are available/
tasked to deal with the more complex IEDs (such as radio controlled examples) in more secure areas (the bottom right 
sector of the chart) – this may become a significant issue as built-up areas in Mosul are liberated.
A similar approach can be applied to placing landmine survey and clearance and EOD within an operating envelope. 
While the nature of IEDs and IEDD present some differences compared to other forms of land release and spot task 
EOD activity, there are underlying characteristics that can be considered from a similar perspective.
5  Without commenting, at this stage, on the validity of the perceptions of the division of tasks, nor on the extent to which operating organisations are fulfilling that 
potential.
6  Information provided by MAG and FSD during discussions with the study team in Erbil, August 2016.
Figure 1. The technical/contextual complexity ‘operating envelope’ (illustrating the perceived spread of 
activities in northern Iraq at the time of the study team’s visit) (image credit: GICHD).
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Device and operational complexity
The technical challenge presented by an IED reflects a number of factors including:
 • The number and type(s) of switches;
 • The location and level of concealment of the device;
 • The surrounding environment;
 • The sophistication and quality of design and build;
 • The intended target;
 • The capability and competence of the group designing, building and using the devices;
 • The time since the device was placed; and
 • Association with other linked or connected devices.
Such an analysis is not unique to IEDs; a similar approach can be applied to the assessment of other forms of ERW 
including landmines and UXO . Complex devices do not only bring additional demands for personal competence and 
technical equipment, but typically demand an increasingly complex system of support – on site and within back-up 
elements. The simplest devices may be susceptible to a response similar to that found on a traditional mine action work 
site (although even here there is a need for command and control, communications, medical and transport support); the 
most complex may require a range of additional components, such as electronic counter measures (ECM ), remotely 
controlled vehicles, and other specialist technical tools, to create an environment in which it is acceptable to deal with a 
suspect device.
Security, insecurity and contextual complexity
The other axis of the operating envelope reflects the situation at, and surrounding, the site of IEDD operations. At its 
lower end lie the most benign situations, where there is no conflict, where there is no expectation of ‘stay behind’ 
elements and where the local population are fully supportive of the IEDD work and operating organisations. At the upper 
end are those locations where military action is ongoing and where hostile elements are likely to attack individuals and 
organisations engaged in operations against IEDs. In the middle are a mix of circumstances associated with proximity to 
areas held by hostile elements, likelihood of stay behind attackers, the presence (and supportiveness) of local populations 
and the level of uncertainty about the stability of the situation.
Northern Iraq includes locations that sit at different points along almost the entire extent of the security spectrum. 
Few places are entirely benign, some are the scene of current (and anticipated) military engagement, but most fall 
somewhere in between. Criteria for assessing the insecurity axis on the operating envelope include: 
 • The proximity and density of hostile elements;
 • The likely presence of ‘stay behind’ and ‘sleeper cells’;
 • The presence and degree of support of the civil population and authorities;
 • The presence of security elements (military, police) and their degree of control;
 • The recent history and stability of the security situation; and
 • Confidence in the security assessment.
The terms ‘permissive , semi-permissive and non-permissive ’ are used by some actors to describe the working 
environment, but as with other aspects of IED terminology with military roots, such terms may prove unwieldy when 
MA actors are trying to determine whether it is appropriate to enter an area or not. The US Department of Defense 
(DoD) defines a permissive environment as: 
Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well 
as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.7
7  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data /p/6126.html
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And a non-permissive environment as: 
An operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to 
operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in the 
intended operational area (Uncertain Environment); or an operational environment in which hostile forces 
have control as well as the intent and capability to oppose or react effectively to the operations a unit 
intends to conduct (Hostile Environment).8
Whatever the situation it is clear that even in many ‘safe’ or ‘permissive ’ environments there could be dormant ISIS 
cells, and areas in relatively close proximity to ISIS areas could come under rocket fire. ”The situation has to be assessed 
on a daily basis”.9 
Mine action operational actors (UN, national authorities, NGOs, commercial companies) have worked in parts of the 
world presenting circumstances lying at many points along the security/insecurity axis. They have had to take decisions 
about when it is appropriate to operate, when to stay at home, when to withdraw entirely from a country or region, and 
when it is appropriate to redeploy, throughout the decades of modern MA operations. The presence of IEDs within the 
environment is a factor to take into account in such decision-making, but it does not alter the basic approaches that mine 
action actors have always had to adopt to assess the safety and appropriateness of their operations.10
8  https://definedterm.com/non_permissive _environment
9  Statement from Coalition Military Forces C-IED team.
10  A relevant current example is South Sudan, where NGOs, commercial operators, UN elements and national authority personnel adapt their responses to the 
prevailing (and often rapidly changing) security circumstances. IEDs are not a significant threat in that country (at least as of 2016), but the sorts of decisions that 
MAMA managers must take are very similar to those faced by managers (often within the same MAMA organisations) in northern Iraq or Afghanistan where 
IEDs are present.
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POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC 
CONTEXT IN NORTHERN IRAQ
NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
Conflict in northern Iraq (and the associated conflict in Syria) is widespread, fluid and complex. It is made up of different 
actions and attacks, from large scale, relatively traditional military campaigns, through smaller scale skirmishes to the 
suicide attacks and drone strikes that are a characteristic of many modern wars. In some areas territory is held and 
bound by front lines, in others there are no clear distinctions with population groups and individuals holding different 
sympathies and allegiances while living in close proximity to each other. 
Some combatant elements are well known – Iraqi Army, Peshmerga , ISIS, but they operate within a much more complex 
environment, especially across the border in Syria, of state, non-state, military, paramilitary, security forces, international 
military supporters, and a number of religious and ethnic political or military groups. The exceptional complexity of the 
political and strategic environment is well known (if not always well understood). What is significant from the perspective 
of this study is that mine action actors are presented with an environment in which the operating envelope presents 
challenges along both the technical and contextual axes.11 Operations take place in areas within the KRG zone and with 
the main part of Iraq, but also in the ‘grey areas’ – areas that formally fall under the control of one authority (in Baghdad 
or Erbil), but that are currently under the control of the other authority.
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS AND CONTAMINATION
IEDs are not the only hazard associated with areas of current and previous conflict. A wide variety of more traditional 
weapon types are in use from air-dropped bombs, through artillery to small arms, adding to the legacy of UXO and AXO 
within the region. Liberation of areas from ISIS control results in finds of unexploded IEDs (such as demolition charges 
that failed to function) as well as abandoned IEDs, whether in place or in storage areas and local factories.
11  This study makes no attempt to describe or analyse the political/military situation in northern Iraq. There are many other sources that do so. The day-to-day 
situation at specific locations is important to individual MAMA actors, as they go about their work, but it is not central to the themes and conclusions of this 
study. 
Figure 2. Landmine/ERW hazards and IED incident locations, January 2014 – January 2016 (image credit: iMMAP).
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Number of IEDs Incidents and Casualties
Killed Injuerd
Anbar 581 1958 508
Babil 62 77 172
Baghdad 1710 2780 8460
Basrah 41 36 65
Diayla 359 599 1469
Duhok 2 2 0
Erbil 9 15 45
Karbala 19 9 36
Kirkuk 107 164 396
Missan 7 1 0
Najaf 6 0 3
Ninawa 105 474 267
Qadsiya 10 1 4
Salah Aldin 466 1396 1316
Slemani 12 9 7
ThiQar 5 3 0
Wassit 6 1 3
Total 3,507                     7,525          12,751              
Number of CasualtiesProvince IED Incidents
Kurdish Controlled Countryside
ISIL Controlled Countryside
Iraq Controlled Countryside
Hazard Type # of Hazard Area size (sqm)
Cluster Munitions 179 209,346,900
Confrontation Area 206 1,016,410,789
ERW 852 504,998,518
MineField 325 1,314,672,925
Total 1,562 3,045,429,131
DMA Landmine/ERW by Type
Hazard Type # of Hazard Area size (sqm)
Dangerous Area 323              42,037,811         
MineField 2,357           137,818,455       
Suspected Hazardous Area 1,081           141,833,198       
Total 3,438          279,651,653       
IKMAA Landmine/ERW by Type
% Hazard Area
n%k MoU Activites
IEDs Incident Location
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Figure 2 highlights the extensive landmine and ERW legacy problem that still affects many parts of the country. One of 
the concerns expressed by MA actors is that the current focus on IEDs, while important in humanitarian terms, risks 
reducing donor and authority awareness of the substantial landmine and UXO problems that will remain, irrespective of 
what is done about IEDs. While most IEDs are likely to degrade and become non-functional over the space of several 
years, many landmines will continue to function as designed for several decades and more. 
IEDD-INVOLVED ORGANISATIONS
Three main categories of organisation engage with IEDs in northern Iraq:
 • Military and security forces;
 • Commercial contractors; and
 • Humanitarian mine action organisations (non-governmental and governmental).
Military and Security Forces
Peshmerga Conduct IEDD and Counter-IED (C-IED) in support of Kurdish military action against ISIS.
Deal with all types and categories of IED as necessary to provide pathways/ corridors for 
attacking military units.
Conduct some post-combat IEDD; mostly at high value infrastructure locations.
Iraqi Army Conduct IEDD and C-IED in support of Iraqi military action against ISIS. 
Deal with all types and categories of IED as necessary to provide pathways/ corridors for 
attacking military units.
Coalition Military Forces Provide C-IED and IEDD training and support to the Peshmerga and Iraqi Army.
Commercial Contractors
Janus Global Operations Contracted by PM/WRA to provide IEDD services in Ramadi.
Tasked by UNDP.
Optima Contracted by UNMAS (through UNOPS) to provide IEDD services in Fallujah.
MA organisations
DMA National authority for mine action in Iraq.
IKMAA National authority for mine action in KRG area.
Coordination with Peshmerga. 
Coordination of MA IEDD operations.
MA and IEDD operations using own teams.
MAG IEDD (predominantly improvised landmines).
Rubble processing with mechanical assets.
Risk education (including IED aspects).
FSD IEDD (predominantly improvised landmines).
HI Victim assistance and (potentially) IEDD operations.
NPA Preparing for engagement with IEDs in KRG area.
DDG Risk education (including IED aspects) and (potentially) IEDD operations.
Further details on the various actors and their operations are provided in Annexes B and C.
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COORDINATION AND TASKING OF IEDD RESPONSES
Coordination
A number of mechanisms are relevant to coordination between IEDD organisations including:
 • Sub-cluster hosted by UNMAS (which may include IKMAA and/or the DMA, from time to time);
 • PM/WRA implementers’ meeting hosted by iMMAP (IKMAA and DMA attend);
 • Ad hoc NGO meetings (with five implementing partners (IPs) and iMMAP);
 • Other bilateral relations with authorities; and
 • Protection cluster (feeding in through the sub-cluster), usually led by UNHCR and an NGO co-leader (International 
Rescue Committee (IRC)).
Coordination mechanisms were originally set up to deal with a refugee problem in the north of Iraq, but then developed 
from a ‘sector’ system to a ‘cluster’ system, as the internally displaced persons (IDP) dimension became more 
significant. Coordination between mine action actors working in the grey areas remains somewhat ad hoc, reflecting the 
fast moving and substantial scale of the humanitarian situation.
The Mosul area is expected to present significant coordination complications. Some parts will be taken by the Iraqi Army, 
some by militias. Areas will fall under Department for Mine Action (Iraq) (DMA) control, but it is likely that organisations 
conducting planning and some operational activity will not have been accredited by the DMA. The MoU for operations 
in the grey area addresses the issue of coordination between the DMA and IKMAA, but it does not cover acceptance of 
accreditation of an operating organisation by one body for work in areas under the other’s control.
Coordination functions, including accreditation and tasking, are not standardised across affected areas and remain 
dependent on individual personalities, rather than common criteria and processes. The Peshmerga have made it clear 
that they can only operate as necessary to support attacks to liberate areas from ISIS. They recognise the need for 
follow-up work, but in the absence of spare resources of their own, have requested that NGOs address IEDs in areas 
behind front lines. The Peshmerga has started coordinating with IKMAA and continues to request additional international 
support to help them deal directly with IEDs. All parties recognise that the biggest gap is in being able to deal with 
houses suspected of containing IEDs.12 
Planning and tasking
The designated tasking authority for the KRG region (including grey areas under Peshmerga control), is IKMAA. Mine 
action NGOs obtain accreditation from IKMAA to work in the region and generally maintain close contact with the 
authority through meetings, visits to work sites by IKMAA quality assurance (QA) teams, and routine administrative 
interaction. For operations coming under Baghdad control, the DMA is the designated authority, although in practice 
current tasking to non-military agencies dealing with IEDs often comes from UN Development Programme (UNDP).
Some organisations are accredited in one part of the country, but not in the other. Danish Demining Group (DDG) has 
been accredited to conduct clearance operations in Iraq for a decade, and is now accredited for risk education (RE) in 
2015 and for EOD as of August 2016 in the KRG area. MAG and FSD are accredited under IKMAA, but not for grey areas 
under the control of the DMA.13 
MAG was approached by UNDP to conduct an assessment of contamination levels in areas that had been held by the 
Peshmerga for several months, and in which people were returning to their homes. MAG carried out a rapid assessment 
and identified 164 locations in the crescent of land north of Sinjar Mountain. 142 were accessible through non-ISIS held 
areas. 105 of those were contaminated and/or contained collapsed buildings, many of which appeared to have been 
demolished by explosive means.14 iMMAP provides satellite imagery, MAG teams mark what they are finding and report 
back to iMMAP, who update the database of contamination, and then disseminate the results to technical teams and 
prioritisers/taskers.
Handicap International (HI) is working with IKMAA and the Peshmerga in grey areas, but has been waiting for several 
months for a task order to conduct non-technical survey (NTS) work 50 km further south (and falling outside IKMAA 
controlled areas), where it is assessed that there is a significant humanitarian need.
12  Although the scale of this gap is still uncertain.
13  This issue is not IEDD- specific, but is of current importance because of the prevalence of improvised landmines in liberated areas.
14  MAG Ninewah Rapid Contamination Assessment, September 2015.
Political and strategic context in northern Iraq 15
FSD ’s first task in March 2016 resulted from a request from the Peshmerga to IKMAA for assistance in a region that 
had been liberated in September 2015. Land that farmers wanted to use for feeding sheep was contaminated and so no 
one had returned. IKMAA did not demand that FSD take up the task, but suggested that they take a look, see if it was 
worthwhile and, if so, proceed with it. Such an approach is common while there is so much uncertainty about what IED 
tasks are appropriate and achievable for MA actors. The sector where that first task was located was relatively quiet, 
but other more recent tasks have been in areas that offer greater potential security challenges, with ISIS two to four 
kilometres away and within line of sight of the task area. Ambushes against Peshmerga forces have influenced FSD 
decisions about which direction to approach task sites from.
IKMAA remains uncertain about the value of tasking mine action assets for house clearance (even if such capabilities are 
available). IKMAA staff have visited areas where houses, partially destroyed by air bombing or the effects of demolition 
charges and IEDs, are being checked. IKMAA is prepared to support the work, but has concerns about the risk of 
destroying houses while working on them. IKMAA policy is that dealing with an intact building should only be carried out 
at the owner’s request, once the owner and national authority decide it is appropriate to proceed. If a suspect device is 
discovered by building processing teams (working through rubble), then a separate specialist team is called in to assess 
the situation and take any further action.15
In principle, tasking of mine action actors for tasks involving IEDs (predominantly used as landmines) should be no 
different from any other form of mine action tasking, but the lack of comprehensive information, combined with rapid 
and significant changes in the humanitarian and security situation bring considerable uncertainty to the tasking process. 
Uncertainty about the limits of capability of different MA actors within the operating envelope compounds the problem.
SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS AND MITIGATION OPTIONS
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Donor confidence Donors could lose confidence in MA 
IEDD if:
 • It is not clear to what extent IEDD 
is appropriate within MA
 • There is uncertainty about the 
competence of MA actors 
to engage in IEDD against 
appropriate targets, under 
appropriate circumstances
 • There are repeated accidents to 
staff engaged in IEDD
 • Results do not appear to justify 
expenditure
 • Activities appear to breach 
normal expectations of neutrality/ 
independence
 • Adjustment of IMAS (and NMAS) to ensure 
coverage of MA-appropriate IED-related 
activities
 • Implementing partner (IP) application of QM 
as per IMAS 07.12, 07.30 & 07.40, including 
appropriate action to ensure the deployment 
of competent people with suitable 
equipment
 • Application of RBM principles and practice
 • Application of normal MA tasking/ 
prioritisation processes
 • Effective communication between IPs and 
donors
 • Management of expectations between 
parties
 • Improved accident investigation and 
response procedures
National authority 
confidence
National authorities may lose confidence 
in MA IEDD if:
 • It is not clear that some 
aspects of IEDD justifiably and 
appropriately come under the 
umbrella of MA
 • There is uncertainty about the 
competence of MA actors 
to engage in IEDD against 
appropriate targets, under 
appropriate circumstances
 • Adjustment of IMAS to clarify applicability to 
MA IED-related activity
 • Updates to NMAS to cover MA-appropriate 
aspects of IEDD
 • Application of external QM as per IMAS 
07.12, 07.30 and 07.40
 • Effective communication between IPs and 
authorities
15  Discussion with IKMAA senior staff, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
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Aspect Notes Mitigation
MA collective 
and individual 
neutrality
All MA actors are likely to wish to 
maintain a ‘neutral’ posture under most 
circumstances. On some occasions 
individual actors (NGO or commercial) 
may be prepared to adopt a posture 
more closely associated with one 
political/conflict party than another. 
Inadvertent loss of neutrality (real or 
perceived) may result in:
 • MA workers becoming targets
 • MA actor organisations becoming 
targets
 • MA, collectively, becoming a 
target
 • Breach of stakeholder rules, 
regulations or expectations
 • Development and implementation of clear 
policies relating to activity in areas subject to, 
or close to, conflict
 • Application of structured risk management 
processes and systems
 • Use SOPs to reinforce compliance with 
neutrality/independence policies
 • Effective IMS including up-to-date, 
comprehensive non-technical information
 • Liaison with UN and other supra-national 
agencies about conflict situation
 • Effective communication with key 
stakeholders
Other mine and 
ERW legacy issues
The current relatively high profile of IED 
and IEDD issues may reduce awareness 
of the continuing significance and impact 
of other ERW legacy issues.
 • Include legacy data in reporting to donors 
and authorities
 • Establish indicators within the IMS that 
relate to legacy issues
 • Maintain profile of legacy issues at Meetings 
of States Party (MSP)
Tasking Poor tasking may result in waste of time, 
money and resources, leading to a loss 
of donor, authority and other stakeholder 
confidence.
 • Apply strategic and risk management 
principles and practice to support 
understanding of the context, stakeholder 
needs and the intended results of tasks
 • Apply effective RBM principles and practice
 • Maintain an effective IMS including 
comprehensive, up-to-date non-technical 
data/information
 • Apply traditional MA approaches to 
prioritizing and tasking operational activity
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AFFECTED COMMUNITY NEEDS 
AND EXPECTATIONS
IMPACTS, NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS
Direct impacts
The impacts of IEDs present similarities and differences compared to those associated with landmines and UXO . The 
similarities arise from their use to deny access to areas or locations, to kill and maim, and to spread fear and uncertainty 
within populations. The differences arise primarily from the places where they may be found.
Landmines are usually associated with rural areas, or open patches of ground in amongst buildings. Unexploded 
ordnance may be widely spread, including in urban areas which have come under attack (such as Aleppo in Syria and 
many European cities that came under aerial bombardment during WWII ). IEDs have a wider spread of influence. They 
are used in open country in much the same way as landmines, but they are also found inside and in amongst buildings, 
including private houses. They may be concealed inside the structure of a building, or inside household appliances, 
books, smaller possessions and vehicles. As such, IEDs have the potential to impact anyone in a family or society, even 
in their own homes.
Inevitably, as people try to return to liberated areas, they risk encountering IEDs. In areas where there are no security 
forces to prevent them entering villages and houses then ‘lots of casualties’ occur.16 Reports from Fallujah and Ramadi 
suggest that some people are trying to deal with the problem themselves, by trying to recruit unemployed deminers and 
entirely inexperienced individuals who are prepared to ”have a go”.17
Indirect impacts
Discussions with officials from the KRG Ministry of the Interior (MoI) highlighted the extent to which the indirect impacts 
of IEDs are severe and felt throughout society and government. The suspected presence of IEDs within liberated areas is 
the cause of widespread fear amongst IDPs and a major reason for their reluctance to leave IDP camps.
The camps themselves are costly to run and represent a significant drain on limited government financial resources. 
At the same time, while people remain in the camps they are not able to engage in economic activity, supporting 
themselves and their families, and generating tax revenue to help support government functions. The resumption 
of agricultural activity (in regions that offer exceptionally fertile conditions capable of generating high yields of arable 
produce) is delayed, increasing the need for external food support, and further reducing the scale of economic activity in 
the region.
The camps are uncomfortable, offering little protection from the extremely high summer temperatures (above 50oC on 
occasions) and the freezing conditions of winter. The longer people remain in camps the less confidence they have in 
any normalization of their lives in the future, and the more susceptible they are to radicalization – potentially sowing the 
seeds of further conflict in the future.
The indirect impacts of IEDs consist of a series of interlocking, and in many cases mutually reinforcing, vicious circles, 
adversely affecting social and economic aspects of communities and authorities, and by extension increasing the burden 
of need presented to international donors and institutions. As is so often the case with negative feedback loops of this 
type, well targeted action to address problems can have an equally powerful positive effect.
Widespread and horrific humanitarian situations increase demands that ‘something must be done’. Experience from 
MA, and other emergency responses, suggests that ‘the right things must be done’, rather than just ‘something’. 
Understanding the nature of the impacts and influences of IEDs (and of the nature and condition of IEDs themselves) 
is important to ensure that action carried out by MA actors is appropriate, effective and as efficient as it can be. Poor 
allocation of resources to tasks will not only reduce the extent to which elements of society can be freed from the 
effects of IEDs, but risks reducing donor confidence and potentially making future funding less likely.
16  Discussions with Coalition Military Forces, Erbil 30th August 2016.
17  Discussions with NPA, Erbil, 1st September 2916.
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Needs and expectations
A basic principle of quality management is the concept of satisfying ‘customer’ needs, combined with a recognition that 
only if those needs are clearly understood and defined can quality be achieved. Satisfying expectations is often a very 
different thing – even when defined requirements have been achieved, ‘customers’ may still be dissatisfied. 
The expectations of displaced people, as well as those who have remained in areas under ISIS occupation, are 
influenced by many different factors relating to the security situation, economic conditions, family circumstances and 
their confidence (or uncertainty) that the situation is unlikely to get worse again. When displaced people do decide they 
want to return home then their expectations are high – they want to be able to return to their homes confident in their 
safety and the safety of their families, and they would like to do so as soon as possible.
The scale of the IED problem, and the scale of the perception of the problem, are not yet well defined in northern Iraq. 
Large areas in the vicinity of previously occupied villages are contaminated with improvised landmines and a range of 
associated command wire/radio controlled IEDs. Villages themselves contain booby traps in some buildings as well as 
undetonated demolition charges and other forms of UXO resulting from bombardment before and during liberation.
At the very least it is clear that there is a widespread fear amongst displaced people. The number of potentially 
contaminated buildings is huge, and the number of people affected by fear of IEDs is also huge. The scale of the 
humanitarian IED response is small in comparison. It is inevitable that some form of prioritization will be implemented 
(either centrally or on an organisation-by-organisation basis). The needs and expectations of some people may be 
satisfied; the expectations of very many others will not. 
Even where some humanitarian work is carried out it may only address part of the problem. Mine action NGOs are clear 
that they are limiting their operations to ILMs in open ground, with a very limited amount of rubble processing using 
mechanical systems. They may be able to clear land surrounding villages, as well as some open areas between buildings, 
but they have no expectation of being able to clear houses potentially containing booby traps. Peshmerga forces may, 
one day, be able to allocate some specialist resources to house clearance work, but they are unlikely to do so while there 
remains an operational demand for their employment in support of continuing action against ISIS. There is a risk that, 
when hostilities cease or significantly reduce, government budget constraints may result in demobilization of military 
assets rather than their redeployment to humanitarian tasks. One NGO made the point that ”there is a coalition to defeat 
ISIS, not one to rebuild afterwards”.
It is likely that there will be dissatisfaction amongst intended beneficiaries at the pace and scope of IED search and 
clearance operations. Some will decide they cannot wait. There will be accidents amongst returnees (as there already 
have been). MA authorities and operators will come under great pressure to respond, and may find themselves on the 
receiving end of considerable hostility from some communities. 
Similar circumstances have arisen in many mine action programmes in the past, and proved to be equally hard to solve. 
Experience suggests that community liaison (CL) functions are especially important under these circumstances. Both 
MAG and DDG are currently engaged in active risk education programmes in Ninewah and Kirkuk provinces as part of 
the overall CL framework.18 It is important that such programmes facilitate the flow of information to, as well as from, 
affected communities to help manage expectations, as well as risk, and to encourage local support for humanitarian 
efforts as much as possible.
GENDER ASPECTS
While some actors are collecting sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) there is still little meaningful analysis relating to 
the impact of IEDs, especially in relation to IDPs and returnees.
Landmines generally have the potential for direct physical impact on people who access land for work, travel or 
recreation. They do not normally extend their potential to cause death or injury to houses, schools and other buildings. 
Landmines and explosive remnants of war typically kill or injure more adults than children and more males than females.19 
The nature of IED contamination may result in a different spread of casualties across sexes and ages, as family members 
encounter devices in houses and local neighbourhoods, as they return from IDP camps. A key aspect of IED use in 
populated areas is that it means that they undoubtedly have a direct impact on women, girls and boys, as well as men.
18  As of 16th August 2016 a total of 389 RE interventions to 20,339 beneficiaries were recorded at locations in the ‘grey area’. Data from iMMAP presentation 
August 2016.
19  Landmine Monitor 2015: Casualties and Victim Assistance – Mine/ERW casualties in 2014 Adults 61%, Children 39%: Male 88%, female 12%.
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NGOs are working in villages that remain deserted as well as those where some members of the previous population 
have returned.20 Displaced people are well aware of the risks associated with returning to their villages. Some limited 
data suggests that men return first to check the situation and secure property before other members of families join 
them.21 At the same time NGO staff members report seeing more women than expected in some liberated villages.22 
Informal data suggests that the great majority (probably over 90%) of IED casualties are male.
The limited SADD available (as at the time of writing this report) means that it is hard to gain a clear idea of the differences 
in direct impact associated with IEDs compared to landmines and general UXO . Risk is likely to be highest on first 
returning to areas where IEDs have either not been cleared at all, or where only limited clearance by military units has 
been carried out. The anticipated liberation of Mosul , with its population of over 1.5 million people, following an extended 
period of ISIS control, is likely to expose more people to the risk of IEDs than on any previous occasion. 
ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
In addition to gender dimensions that may be different from those associated with traditional MA programmes, the 
nature of the conflict in Iraq, Syria and the KRG area, means that ethnic and religious aspects of affected societies are 
an inescapable factor to consider. Anecdotal information suggests that ISIS tends to target property belonging to some 
ethnic groups (such as the Kurds and Yazidis) with a lower likelihood that property belonging to ethnic/religious groups 
more closely associated with ISIS would be booby trapped. 
A number of sources describe villages associated with one predominant ethnic or religious group entirely flattened 
except for the mosque. It is not possible to reach a clear position on this topic, in the absence of supporting evidence, 
but the fact that such aspects may be significant raises points for consideration under the overall heading of non-technical 
survey (NTS), and the value that reliable data may have during later general risk assessment and prioritisation processes.
SUMMARY OF AFFECTED COMMUNITY ASPECTS AND MITIGATION OPTIONS
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Understanding 
affected community 
impacts & needs
Understanding affected community 
impacts (arising from IEDs), needs and 
expectations is necessary to support 
effective RBM, QM, prioritization and 
tasking functions. Poor understanding 
may result in:
 • Reduced community confidence
 • Reduced community cooperation
 • Inefficient prioritisation and 
tasking
 • Waste of time, money and 
resources
 • Reduced stakeholder confidence 
(including donors and authorities)
 • Application of strategic and risk 
management principles and practice to 
support understanding of the context, 
affected community impacts and needs 
 • Application of effective RBM principles and 
practice
 • Collection of SADD 
 • Appropriate focus on ethnic and religious 
aspects of the non-technical environment
 • Effective NTS, CL and RE to collect 
information relevant to understanding 
community aspects
 • Effective IM including indicators relating to 
stakeholder impact
20  FSD in the grey areas around Daquq in Kirkuk Province is working almost entirely in currently deserted villages; MAG working around Sinjar in Ninewah Province 
is in areas where significant numbers of returnees are present.
21  MAG Ninewah Rapid Contamination Assessment September 2015 – 3.3.1 questionnaire participants by gender.
22  Meeting with Nina Seecharan, MAG Country Director at MAG offices Erbil, 1st September 2016.
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Affected community 
confidence
The presence (real or feared) of IEDs in 
liberated areas is a major barrier to the 
return of IDPs. Expectations amongst 
returnees are likely to be high. MA (and 
other resources) responding to IED 
contamination will not be able to satisfy 
all those expectations. Consequences 
may include:
 • Reduced community cooperation
 • Reduced NTS effectiveness
 • Outright hostility towards MA 
actors
 • Effective communication (including 
through CL and RE) to manage stakeholder 
expectations 
 • Implementation of effective NTS (as per 
IMAS 08.10)
 • Application of normal land release (LR) 
processes to cancel/reduce land wherever 
possible
 • Liaison with government, military, police and 
security actors
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TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF IEDs IN NORTHERN IRAQ
IEDs in areas addressed by Peshmerga units are overwhelmingly constructed and used by ISIS. In other parts of Iraq the 
current IED issue is predominantly an ISIS-created one, but IEDs have been used by other groups in the past. Some non-
ISIS devices may remain in areas that have not previously been searched. 
Construction
Local manufacture of IEDs of certain types (especially for use as landmines) is managed on a considerable scale across all 
regions under ISIS control. Peshmerga forces have found a number of factories capable of producing IEDs to a standard 
design in large numbers. People escaping from Mosul reported that there were so few jobs and many people were so 
poor under ISIS that they would work ‘making munitions’ for 15,000 Dinars a day (approx.US$15) even if they didn’t 
support ISIS. 23 The nature of the manufacturing process is such that there is variation in build quality and consistency, but 
such cottage industries highlight the blurring of boundaries associated with use of the word ‘improvised’.
FSD report that most of the ILMs they encounter are similar, working to a common design, but with some variations 
suggesting that they are not all made in one place, but at a number of satellite manufacturing locations. Out of around 
800 IEDs dealt with to date, only a handful have had switches that are not pressure plates or crush necklaces. Not one 
of the IEDs encountered would be regarded as hi-tech; no radio controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) for instance. On three or four 
occasions an abandoned command wire has been found, but they have been “relatively straightforward to deal with”.24
The majority of devices found in northern Iraq use Chinese 9V batteries as the power source with detonators (mostly 
appearing to be from Indian manufacturers, although with some locally improvised) connected to detonating cord (also 
often of Indian manufacture), leading to a main charge made from home-made explosive (HME).
Janus Global Operations (JGO) report that around 95% of the devices they deal with are ILM, with a pressure plate 
switch and a 5-gallon container of HME. Some devices are obscured/concealed by being glued on grass. Many devices 
use the same blue tape to secure components to each other, and exhibit similar levels of rusting and deterioration 
(suggesting that they were all made around the same time). Any differences imply that the devices are from a different 
source. All such devices are ‘factory manufactured’. Very few devices contain any military ordnance.25
 
  
23  Reported in The Times of London, 5th November 2016.
24 Meeting with FSD technical staff, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
25  Meeting with JGO technical staff, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
Figure 3. ‘Crush necklace’ switch element (image credit: FSD). Figure 4. 9V battery used to power improvised landmine 
pressure plate switch (image credit: FSD).
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ISIS have developed the way they use IEDs in the region. ‘At first they were visible and simple; it was possible to see 
them and how they were made’. Over time devices became more sophisticated and harder to see and assess. Today the 
Peshmerga see devices including:
 • Mobile phones and other mechanisms for control from a distance;
 • Timer switches started by movement in the vicinity of the device;
 • Sound triggers within houses; and
 • Circuit boards suggesting increasingly hi-tech designs (and possibly including measures to counter ECM).
The most advanced IEDs have been found in Mahmoud and Ghawar (south of Erbil). Whoever is making these devices 
”knows what they are doing, has experience, and an academic background”.26 Some recently found IEDs contain 
chemical products, have four different switch/trigger mechanisms and are easily put together. Analysis suggests they 
contain sulphuric acid and chlorine/mustard agents.
Use of IEDs
While specific tactics and methods vary, reflecting the flexible and irregular use of IEDs, some scenarios are more 
commonly encountered than others. Figure 5 illustrates the sort of mix of devices associated with a number of villages 
liberated from ISIS control and now within the grey area, under Peshmerga control.27
A defensive berm (a low ridge of sand/earth) and ditch is constructed by ISIS forces between the village and the expected 
direction of Peshmerga attack. A large number of ILMs are placed in rows, typically two or three, either side of the 
defensive ditch, extending for many hundreds of metres in either direction and with the mines in a zig-zag pattern (Figure 
6). Some ILMs are linked to other nearby devices to ensure simultaneous detonation. 
Command wire IEDs (CWIEDs) are used on roads approaching the village from the Peshmerga threat direction, as well 
as at selected points along the defensive berm. CWIEDs are controlled from a command point within the village. RCIEDs 
may also be used on some occasions. Booby traps are placed in structures and houses to disrupt and delay attacking 
operations and to discourage population return. Some buildings may have been rigged for destruction with demolition 
charges that have failed to function or have been abandoned.
26 Statements from Peshmerga Senior Engineer Officer.
27 Similar circumstances may be associated with some sites in areas under Iraqi Army control. The information used in this case was specific to the experience of 
Peshmerga units and coalition forces training elements.
Figure 5. Illustrative situation in liberated village in the ‘grey areas’ - information provided by 
Coalition Forces C-IED training team, Erbil, August 2016 (image credit: GICHD).
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At Tel-al-Arab three lines of ILM were present: the first close beside the defensive berm; the second 75 m out towards 
the expected direction of attack; the last 100 m out. A similar methodology is associated with every area that has been 
under ISIS control. It is cheap to manufacture ILMs in large numbers and ”they are now regarded as the preferred 
defensive weapon for insurgents”.28
Peshmerga sources report that, ”in the early days”, it was normal to encounter one or two devices at a location; now it is 
normal to find fields of devices. At a task in Koalabuah area, a Peshmerga team was sent to destroy ‘an IED’, but as they 
investigated the surrounding situation they found, and ended up destroying, 31 devices. Some of the devices are self-
contained (that is the switch, power source, initiator and main charge are all in one container). It is common to observe 
sympathetic detonation when one device is destroyed, even when they are not directly linked in any way.29
Variations to the general situation reflect changing Peshmerga tactics and the experience of ISIS commanders and IED 
designers. An important factor dictating the situation found by IEDD operators (initially Peshmerga, but subsequently 
commercial and NGO teams) is the history of the site. Both how long ISIS occupied the site, and when they did so, 
influence the nature and extent of IED contamination. ISIS continues to place devices in houses and vehicles as well 
as using suicide bombers. The longer the time in place, the more opportunity for ISIS engineers to place IEDs in large 
numbers, to booby trap more structures and to conceal IEDs more thoroughly. The design of specific IEDs indicates 
when occupation took place - the more recent the occupation the more likely that the latest designs will be in place.
Even within a given time window of occupation there are variations in design and use of IEDs, reflecting the lack of 
overarching ISIS doctrines and policies on the construction and use of IEDs. It is clear that there is a degree of 
communication and cross-fertilisation of ideas between regions, centres and individual IED engineers, but there is also 
considerable variation, reflecting the preferences, skills and access to materials of different IED designers and users. In 
general, “everything DAESH do they do to overkill”.30
A number of operating organisations commented that ISIS had the opportunity to observe the Iraqi Army at work in 
Fallujah, and have had plenty of time to prepare in Mosul to make life very difficult for liberating forces, and those who 
follow on afterwards.
28 Meeting with JGO technical staff, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
29  Discussion with Peshmerga senior Engineer Officer and Coalition Military Forces, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
30 FSD comment during meeting with study team, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
Figure 6. Marker flags showing the location of improvised landmines in multiple rows in northern Iraq (image credit: FSD).
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Prevalence of IED types
Amongst the mine action actors interviewed for this study, there is a clear view that almost all devices they deal with are 
improvised landmines. MAG reports that over 96% of devices cleared to date in northern Iraq have been improvised anti-
personnel landmines, and over 99% of improvised devices in north-eastern Syria.31 Other MA actors report similar ratios.32 
Most MA operations have taken place in open land outside villages. There is a general expectation that villages and 
towns will contain different types of IED, with a greater proportion of command operated and radio controlled devices. It 
is clear that such devices are present, but MAG reports that they have now been involved in survey and clearance around 
‘hundreds of liberated villages’ and find that the number of non-landmine type devices remains low, with only around 3% 
of IEDs constituting booby traps.33
31  Data from MAG presentation to IMAS Review Board sub-group meeting, UN New York, 18th October 2016.
32  For instance, Janus reports around 95% of improvised devices they have dealt with in Ramadi are improvised land mines.
33  Meeting with MAG senior managers, New York, 19th October 2016.
Figure 7. Improvised devices by type, as cleared by MAG in northern Iraq to October 2016 (image credit: GICHD).
Figure 8. Improvised devices by type, as cleared by MAG in north eastern Syria to October 2016 (image credit: GICHD).
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HUMAN RESOURCES
Availability of IEDD operators
The availability of competent people in sufficient numbers to engage in humanitarian IEDD operations is a cause of 
widespread concern. Highly qualified and experienced people come from a military background, but they are not available 
in large numbers, those who are available may not wish to work in the circumstances of northern Iraq (or other similar 
places around the world), expectations of terms and conditions amongst those prepared to deploy are high, and the 
scale of the need is in any case likely to dwarf the scale of the response available from such sources. 
It is clear that a competence solution that is based wholly on the availability of ex-military IEDD trained personnel is 
bound to fail – there just are not enough individuals to satisfy the need. But in much the same way that not every EOD 
operator needs to be able to cope with the most complex of UXO items, so not everyone employed in searching for, and 
disposing of, IEDs needs to be qualified to the highest standards. The question ‘if we don’t address IEDs who will?’ was 
raised several times during the study visit.34 The key follow-on question is ‘what level of aptitude, skills and knowledge is 
required for what activities’?
As with other aspects of the IED issue, discussion of competence requirements is hampered by imprecise and limited 
vocabulary, combined with different understandings of terminology between organisations and even between individual 
commentators. 
Personnel competence 
Establishing and maintaining ‘competence’ is a quality management (QM) function. QM is about the satisfaction of 
requirements and maintaining competence is no different. Competence requirements should be dictated by the nature 
of the task that operators are required to address. In QM terms competence is often described in terms of aptitude, 
skills and knowledge. All three aspects are relevant to IEDD. The complexity axis of the operating envelope model 
indicates that some devices are less challenging to address than others, and by implication, require a narrower range of 
competence than others.35
IED Group Types potentially suitable for EOD 3+ Types requiring IEDD
Command operated
Command Wire (CWIED)35
Command pull
Radio controlled (RCIED)
Victim operated (VOIED)
Pressure plate (PPIED)
Trip wire (TWIED)
Crush necklace
Infrared passive
Infrared active
Anti-lift
Tilt switch
Pressure switch
Light sensitive
Magnetic
Household switches
As with mine action there are occasions when it is convenient and appropriate to separate the search function from the 
disposal function – most deminers are trained to call over a supervisor to confirm and identify that a detected object is 
a mine or other hazardous object. Disposal is carried out after withdrawal of the search capacity. Competence to search 
for IEDs in open country is different from the competence necessary to search a house, and the competence necessary 
to search for a device is different from that needed to deal with it (by destroying it or rendering it safe for transport to a 
separate disposal location).
34  Most forcefully by the Chief of Operations at IKMAA . As an arm of the KRG , IKMAA has no choice, but to respond to the pressing humanitarian need, while 
being constrained by a chronic shortage of funding, and recognizing that the safety of staff members remains a continuing imperative.
35  With the proviso that the IEDD operator/team has control of both ends of the command wire.
Figure 9. Illustrative competence separation matrix for EOD 3+ and IEDD qualified personnel. Note that EOD 3+ implies successful 
completion of specific-to-task training over and above that associated with the basic EOD level 3 standard (image credit: GICHD).
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Figure 9 offers an illustrative approach to associating different types of IED with different levels of competence in relation 
to command and victim operated IEDs. Other considerations that an operating organisation may take into account before 
determining its own approach include:
 • Noting that an IED may have more than one type of switch associated with it;
 • A time delay switch may be built into other switch types – for instance a pressure switch may start a time delay 
to detonation rather than just initiate an immediate detonation, to catch out the unwary operator; and
 • Local (time and location) variations may heighten or reduce the complexity and competence requirements 
associated with different groups of IED and switch types.
Application of an approach along the lines shown in Figure 9 relies upon confidence that the types of IED that will be 
encountered can be predicted reliably, that changes in the situation will be picked up early, and that appropriate action 
to adjust competence levels (through new equipment, procedures and/or training as appropriate) will be taken to ensure 
continued operator safety and clearance quality. Two important implications arise from that assumption:
 • Any IEDD response must include access to a higher level of competence able to assess the situation, make 
sense of new information and determine the level of operator competence required; and
 • There must be access to an effective information management system (IMS) capable of flagging up changes 
in circumstances, identifying trends, monitoring performance and communicating information relevant to risk 
management at every level.
Even where it is assessed that circumstances are suitable for clearance by EOD 3+ operators, it is essential that 
organisations have the procedural systems and knowledge to:
 • Understand where operations sit in the operating envelope;
 • Ensure that operators are competent to conduct operations within clearly defined operating envelope limits;
 • Stop operations, that may fall outside limits, in good time to allow further investigation by appropriately 
competent personnel, before lives are put at unacceptable risk;
 • Interpret new experiences and information in terms of their IED risk and competence implications; and
 • Review the overall situation (technical, operational and contextual) on an ongoing basis to ensure that activities 
remain within agreed operating envelope bounds. 
MA actors in northern Iraq are addressing the competence requirement from two perspectives:
 • Recruiting ex-military personnel with existing IEDD qualifications; and
 • Deploying EOD 3+ personnel on tasks deemed to fall within acceptable limits.
Following a fatal accident earlier in the year, FSD now implements a semi-formal familiarisation training process for new 
IEDD personnel, followed by an evaluation conducted by senior FSD technical personnel, and a further assessment by 
IKMAA QA personnel. Only international personnel are authorised by FSD to engage in IEDD. For rural ILM clearance 
FSD’s view is that good deminers are suitable for the task.36
Employing personnel with recent IEDD experience may address many aspects of the competence requirement, but it 
will not address all of them on its own. There will always be additional knowledge relating to the operating organisation, 
its procedures and the situation at specific working locations that must be included – not only on first arriving in the 
theatre of operations, but on an ongoing basis thereafter. Effective training relies upon access to up-to-date, reliable 
information and the availability of competent trainers. FSD makes the point that in the past, in the MA context, there 
was an assumption that international staff were automatically accepted as expert on arrival, but that the same attitude 
(whether or not it was appropriate for MA) is not acceptable in an IED context.37
Handicap International wanted to recruit IEDD staff, but found that they were hard to find and that they couldn’t 
compete with commercial companies for the terms and conditions on offer. HI does not want to reduce the standard 
of competence if they reduce recruitment requirements, so are now looking at staff with combat engineer, high risk 
search and EOD level 3 experience, and are having more success. The intention is to build IEDD capacity in the region, 
using international staff as technical field managers (TFMs) and mentors, with national staff making up the main team 
strength. The HI approach reflects experience gained in Colombia (where there is significant use of IEDs as landmines) 
and includes a focus on update training at least several times per year. HI raised the possibility of sharing the most highly 
competent IEDD personnel between several MA organisations. 38
36  Meeting with FSD technical personnel, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
37  Meeting with FSD technical personnel, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
38  Discussions with HI senior country staff, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
Technical and operational aspects 27
Enhancing the capability of existing MA staff is likely to be appropriate under some circumstances within clearly defined 
limits. It is especially important when doing so to ensure that specific-to-task training effectively fills competence gaps, 
relevant to the type of work that will be performed, and is delivered by trainers competent to do so.
In any operational situation, and especially so when IEDs are concerned, mission creep and competency drift must be 
guarded against. Mission creep occurs when an operator who has been trained on certain types of IED starts to deal 
with types that are slightly different, and then with others slightly different again, before finding themselves working in 
a part of the operating envelope distant from that for which they were trained. Competence drift occurs when, through 
repeated application of similar procedures to similar types of IED, complacency creeps in, basic principles are forgotten 
or overtaken by a gentle drift in procedural approaches, until some apparently slight difference in the situation results in a 
catastrophic accident.
Like any other aspect of MA, dealing with IEDs requires a system-based approach, recognizing the need for a variety 
of processes to combine together to ensure that an operator is ready and able to perform the job safely, effectively and 
efficiently. A competent operator can only perform to the required standard if supported by a competent organisation, 
including competent supervisors, advisers and trainers, using appropriate, well maintained equipment, and applying 
procedures that are suited to the task in hand. Underpinning the entire structure is the need for an IMS operating to a 
very high standard, reliably, continually and with constant analysis of new data about tasks and the performance of the 
organisation and its staff.
All the same principles apply (and should be implemented) to land release and EOD operations, but MA actors are 
perhaps less used to the need to define (and regularly review) competence limits and to be prepared to apply additional 
training on a frequent basis, as is required when dealing with IEDs.
EQUIPMENT
MA operators (NGO and commercial) in Iraq do not use disruptors, partly because of donor reluctance to agree to buy 
them, but also because, in areas under the control of the Iraqi Army, only the Iraqi Army is allowed to intentionally cause 
an explosion.39 MA operators preparing to start work in ILM areas have said that they do not anticipate needing new 
equipment, so long as their work is restricted to that type of IED. 
Most operators take the view that, when operating against IEDs containing large main charges (as is the case with most 
ILMs), there is no advantage gained from wearing personal protective equipment (PPE), but considerable disadvantage 
when working in very high ambient temperatures. Nevertheless, one donor has demanded that IEDD operators working 
on one project funded by that donor wear PPE. 
Detectors have been identified as a key issue. ”Locating and reaching the device is the critical point – usually final 
disposal is fairly straightforward.”40 Several operators have identified mechanical equipment as an attractive category of 
tool to have available; armoured plant units are in use by MAG to support processing of collapsed building rubble. The 
scale of the need for rubble processing, and the value of deploying armoured plant, is not yet entirely clear.
The subject of electronic counter measures (ECM ) was raised on many occasions during the study visit and subsequent 
meetings. Experienced IEDD operators highlighted the need for ECM at any location where there is a threat of radio 
controlled (R/C) switches. Some MA operators address the risks of R/C switches through a wider assessment of context 
taking the view that, even if the R/C switch remains functional, if there is no one at the other end of the R/C link, then the 
risk is tolerable. What is clear is that suitable ECM equipment may be costly (informal estimates of over US$ 100,000 per 
unit were provided by some qualified IEDD personnel, while some providers claim to offer suitable equipment for much 
lower prices), often subject to export restrictions, and must be adapted to the local situation (correct frequencies, etc.). 
Wider counter-terrorist security controls mean that obtaining explosives for EOD demolition purposes has become very 
difficult, even in the KRG area, where MA organisations are accredited to conduct independent open detonation (OD) 
operations. In areas under control of the DMA and Iraqi Army, the restriction on initiation of intentional explosions to the 
Iraqi Army have always placed a constraint on the ease with which MA operators can destroy devices in situ.
Difficulties in obtaining explosives are one factor leading to the use of manual render safe procedures (RSPs) on many 
improvised landmines; another is the sheer number of devices. There is little doubt that the net effect is to increase 
the risks faced by operators. Easier access to explosives would give operators more options in dealing with devices, as 
would access to disrupters and suitable tools for remote conduct of RSPs.
39  Disruptors are tools that use a small explosive charge to propel a slug of water at high velocity to separate the components of an IED. They are designed to 
reduce the likelihood that the device will detonate while being disrupted.
40  Discussions with HI technical and project management staff, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
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RISK MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
Threat/risk assessments
Risk assessment (RA) takes place through both formal and informal methods. Informally, all organisations maintain 
a degree of awareness of the types of devices they expect to encounter and of the local security circumstances 
surrounding operating locations.
In non-Kurdish parts of Iraq, a threat impact assessment (TIA) is carried out for each hazardous area/location in much 
the same way that a field-based NTS is carried out in any other land release process, but adapted to the specific 
circumstances and to avoid appearing to apply an NTS approach (which would raise questions about the authority of 
some agencies under their accreditation agreements).
Operating procedures
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for work against ILMs in open fields represent adaptations of existing SOPs 
used in other MA clearance operations. FSD clears along lines of ILMs. If there is a space between rows they may 
or may not clear depending on the separation distance and local circumstances. In general, a 25 m fade out distance 
is applied from IED/ILM lines. The expectation is that either gaps will be filled in at a later date, or that additional non-
technical information (such as evidence that intermediate land is used for agriculture) will allow eventual land release by 
cancellation or reduction. 
FSD is approaching the work very conservatively, to such an extent that local deminers, especially those with many 
years of mine action experience, become frustrated.41 Site management is conducted along the same lines as for other 
MA activities. The number of ILMs encountered, as well as difficulties in obtaining explosives for OD operations, mean 
that both MAG and FSD are conducting manual RSPs. Concerns about ISIS becoming aware of the details of RSPs 
and SOPs mean that operators prefer to establish general technical SOPs, leaving the fine detail of how to approach 
individual devices to the operator’s experience and assessment of the situation (an approach that is consistent with 
normal military/security force practice, but which may mean that quality management systems must adapt to accept 
that not all operational requirements are fully documented).
QUALITY MANAGEMENT
A number of MA actors expressed uncertainty about ‘how to do QM on IEDD’. External quality management functions 
are carried out by IKMAA and mainly include observation of field activity. FSD receives IKMAA QA inspections at least 
weekly, and more commonly twice a week. IKMAA reviews site documentation, then observes field operations, checking 
working practices, safety separation distances, compliance with SOPs and the making safe of devices (observed from 
a distance using binoculars). Demolitions are generally carried out once a week and are also observed by IKMAA QA 
officers.42 External quality assessment officers continue to approach the work from a mine action perspective, but 
acknowledge that there is a need to learn about the details of IEDD work as well.43
IKMAA identifies some differences in how handover processes work when dealing with an IED-contaminated area as 
opposed to one with ‘normal’ landmines. In a mined area the entire cleared area is handed over. For IED areas checks 
may be carried out in a buffer zone around the lines of ILMs, but the clearance team is only responsible for the specific 
area that has been fully cleared. There is not the capacity to fully search the area between ILM rows, so that on handover 
the areas between rows are effectively treated as ‘no comment’ zones.44 It is expected that, at some later date, dogs or 
mechanical systems will be used to investigate areas between ILM rows. 
The question of clearance quality standards and definitions was brought up by JGO, as well as other organisations, 
during subsequent meetings.45 Clearance of an area contaminated with mines and/or UXO is well understood by the MA 
sector and is addressed through depth and minimum target specifications in NMAS, task orders and contracts. Achieving 
a similar level of clarity in relation to a potentially contaminated house or other structure, is not as well understood or 
defined.
41  Discussions with FSD , Erbil, 29th August 2016.
42  Discussions with FSD technical managers, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
43  Discussions with MAG senior managers, Erbil, 29th August 2016.
44  Discussions with IKMAA, Erbil, 28th August 2016.
45  Including during the IMAS IEDD sub-group meeting in New York in October 2016.
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RISK EDUCATION
In the same way that MA came to understand early on in its history that clearance was not the only means to mitigate 
the risks associated with landmines and unexploded ordnance, so it is clear that IEDD should only be one element of a 
coordinated, comprehensive and flexible response to the presence (real or suspected) of IEDs in an area. Risk education 
(RE) activity is already under way in liberated areas. The main implementers of RE activity in northern Iraq are MAG and 
DDG (Figure 10). 
DDG makes the point that the nature of improvised weapons is that they vary and change and that there is little point 
showing pictures of IEDs that have been discovered if it is likely that other devices will look significantly different in the 
near future. The circumstances in northern Iraq (and elsewhere) are such that RE activities may:
 • put providers of RE at risk (if they come to the attention of IED ‘owners’); and
 • put recipients of RE at risk if they report the presence of suspected IEDs (and come to the attention of the IEDs’ 
owner as having done so).
To help navigate the complexities of surrounding circumstances and the implications for the content, delivery and 
suitability of RE, DDG has developed a decision process map (Figure 11), capturing overall policy about RE in IED 
environments and the main elements of any response.46
46  DDG presentation to IMAS Review Board sub-group meeting at UN New York, 18th October 2016.
Figure 10. Risk education activities carried out by MAG and DDG, as at 16th August 2016,  
information provided by iMMAP (image credit: iMMAP).
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
IEDD information management (IM) in northern Iraq relies upon use of existing information management systems for 
mine action (IMSMA), forms and procedures, as well as local responses, within individual organisations, and a mix of 
formal and informal information sharing through meetings and common-interest groups. MA actors report a number 
of shortcomings relating to IM, some of which are common to many mine action programmes, some of which reflect 
specific issues associated with IEDs and IEDD.
iMMAP is at the hub of formal information sharing systems, but political issues, in particular the separate nature of the 
DMA’s and IKMAA’s responsibilities, brings a degree of complexity to the system unusual in most mine action 
programmes. Some data cannot be shared, even when it is received, because of governmental restrictions. To make 
things even harder the DMA and IKMAA have different customized versions of IMSMA that do not make data sharing 
easy. iMMAP is party to an MoU with both the DMA and IKMAA covering information management aspects of work in 
the grey areas, and has designed IMSMA forms to work with both systems. Very little data is available from areas under 
ISIS control. iMMAP is keen to encourage Peshmerga representation at technical meetings to encourage more 
information sharing. Initially, reports from Janus were sent to the DMA, but they were not continuing on to iMMAP. After 
recent meetings in Baghdad information is now beginning to flow, including from Al Fahad, although it is not yet clear 
whether all reports are being received at iMMAP.47
47  Al Fahad is the locally accredited operating partner of JGO and Optima for work in Fallujah and Ramadi.
Figure 11. DDG IED risk education decision process map (image credit: DDG).
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For the grey areas the NTS IMSMA form has been customized to include IEDs. Surveyors provide a spot location if an 
IED is visible, otherwise an area. Locations may be collected using GPS, sometimes on sketch maps. IEDs are generally 
simply recorded as ‘homemade’. ”In the absence of an IMAS it is not clear what category to put different devices in.”48 
There is a clear understanding that more detail is required in reporting forms. Completion forms do not include detail 
about exactly what was found where. Quick data collection methods have been developed using a free App; a picture 
can be taken and coordinates are automatically recorded. 
Several actors noted the difficulties arising from using IMSMA forms designed for use in a traditional mine action 
environment in one where IEDs are prevalent. The study team were told that ”it would be better to start again with 
a clean sheet of paper”. The MA sector in northern Iraq appears to be waiting until IMSMA forms have been adjusted 
before deciding what data needs to be collected. iMMAP is not sure that all problems arise from the structure of the 
forms themselves, but may also reflect issues to do with reporting mechanisms.
A technical working group (TWG) meets on a monthly basis and includes discussions about types of IED, working 
methodologies and other aspects such as proposed handover documents for IEDD operations (including who decides 
to destroy/damage houses if doing so is unavoidable during IEDD operations). iMMAP runs a daily security incidents 
database, has access to the legacy landmine impact survey (LIS), and UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) 
data relating to security. iMMAP maintains up-to-date analysis of where most accidents happen each month, as well as a 
range of indicators relating to where organisations are working and what they are finding. iMMAP feeds into the Health 
Cluster, Protection Cluster, UNOCHA and, most recently, the Food Security Cluster.
A number of MA actors complain that information goes into the central IMSMA database, but relatively little comes out 
again. Similar situations have arisen in other mine action programmes, but the consequences of restricted information 
sharing in an IED environment is more serious. Individual mine action organisations engaged in IEDD have their own 
internal IM systems, but there is inconsistency over what data is collected, and how terminology is applied to the various 
devices that are discovered. Decisions about what should be collected reflect the preferences of individual technical 
specialists.
iMMAP records major accidents (such as those recently suffered by FSD and JGO), but minor accidents and near misses 
are not captured.
AGEING AND DEGRADATION OF IEDs
Opinions vary on the question of how quickly IED components are likely to deteriorate and fail, especially the 9V batteries 
that comprise the majority of IED power sources in the region. None of the actors spoken to for this study are collecting 
formal data on IED condition, and no testing regime is in place for recovered batteries.
It is likely that many IEDs will become non-functional (at least as designed) more quickly than is the case for landmines. 
In due course more information on this topic is likely to become important to support risk management, procedural 
developments and prioritization processes.49
48  Meeting with iMMAP, Erbil, 28th August 2016.
49  The GICHD study into ageing of IEDs in Colombia , in cooperation with DAICMA (the national authority), may be relevant in this respect.
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SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND MITIGATION OPTIONS
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Operating 
envelope
Operations outside an organisation’s safe 
operating envelope (either inadvertently, or 
through inappropriate tasking, lack of risk 
management information, etc.) may place 
operators and support staff at unacceptable 
risk. Consequences may include:
 • Excessive and avoidable accidents/
fatalities
 • Reduced confidence and morale 
amongst tasking authorities, 
planners and operators
 • Reduced donor confidence
 • Compromise of an organisation’s 
neutral status
 • Develop and use a common lexicon to describe 
different types of IED
 • Describe and assess contextual aspects 
including security/insecurity and situational 
complexity
 • Use the operating envelope concept to discuss, 
agree and implement boundaries of competence 
and capability
 • Maintain awareness of where in the operating 
envelope different activities, tasks and locations 
lie
 • Assess competence, equipment, support and 
procedural requirements within the operating 
envelope
Information 
management
Good IM underpins all management activity 
at every level. IM in an IED environment 
needs to work better and faster than 
in some traditional MA environments. 
Inadequate IM may result in:
 • Ineffective risk management
 • Increased safety risk for operators 
and support staff
 • Poor strategic planning
 • Poor task selection and prioritisation
 • Inefficient task planning and 
implementation
 • Reduced results within affected 
populations
 • Encourage a culture in which IEDD organisations 
and individuals are hungry for data of all types
 • Reinforce awareness that collecting and 
reporting data is a primary part of any IEDD 
operator’s job description
 • Gather data about technical, contextual and 
strategic aspects of all operations
 • Apply normal principles of NTS to all aspects of 
operations
 • Collect, report and analyse SADD
 • Do not wait for specialist forms to be generated 
by IMSMA operators; collect all relevant data 
now, using locally generated forms if necessary, 
holding data in spreadsheets or other convenient 
formats
 • Share data through formal and informal channels 
with other stakeholders involved in responding to 
IED contamination
 • Analyse data independently or collectively, 
even if formal mechanisms have not yet been 
established
 • Encourage and support standardisation of 
terminology and data descriptions using agreed 
lexicons
 • Encourage appropriate sharing of data by 
authorities, but do not stop collecting and 
reporting data just because some data 
authorities may appear to be IM ‘black holes’
Technical and operational aspects 33
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Risk 
management
Good risk management, informed by good 
IM, provides the fundamental structure 
of all management decision-making, at 
every level. Risk management requires: the 
identification and reduction of uncertainty; 
identification, analysis and evaluation of 
risks; as well as mitigation of risks through 
avoidance, removal of risk sources, 
reducing the likelihood or consequence 
of risk events, the sharing of risk, or the 
acceptance of tolerable risk. Poor risk 
management may lead to:
 • Inefficiency
 • Ineffectiveness
 • Increased costs
 • Reduced safety and increased 
accidents
 • Delays 
 • Reduced stakeholder confidence
 • Reduced stakeholder engagement, 
cooperation and support
 • Loss of organisational/programme 
credibility and reputation
 • Missed opportunities
 • Adopt structured risk management systems 
(as per ISO 31000) at all levels of strategic, 
operational, procedural and technical planning 
and operations
 • Drive IMS to deliver the information necessary to 
support effective risk management
 • Review all aspects of IEDD operations (from 
strategic to technical) from a risk management 
perspective
 • Identify all risk mitigation options; asses them, 
select the most appropriate
 • Avoid choosing the most obvious or first 
encountered option when choosing risk 
mitigation options
 • Be ready to apply multiple mitigation options in 
parallel
 • Remember that mitigating one risk can give rise 
to new risks
 • Take effective action to avoid complacency, habit-
forming, mission-creep and competency slippage
Tasking Inappropriate tasking may lead to IPs 
engaging in unsuitable operations for which 
they are not fully prepared or competent. 
Tasking ‘for the sake of doing something’ 
may put operators at risk for little or no 
justification and undermine the credibility of 
IEDD operations with affected populations, 
donors and other important stakeholders.
 • Watch out for tasking on the basis that 
‘something must be done’ or ‘something must 
be seen to be done’
 • Maintain contextual/RBM awareness when 
considering the need, priority and justification of 
tasks
 • Consider suitability of combination of task and 
implementing partner in terms of operating 
envelope boundaries
 • Apply normal MA principles to task selection, 
prioritisation, planning and implementation
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Aspect Notes Mitigation
Procedures SOPs are an important risk mitigation tool, 
but they must remain appropriate to the 
specific circumstances and technical details 
associated with operations. Changes in IED 
design and use, over time, and from one 
area to another, as well as the prevailing 
security situation, must be reflected in the 
SOPs applied by IEDD operators (and their 
supporting resources). Inflexible or slow 
to respond external approval systems, 
or poor internal improvement feedback 
processes, can lead to SOPs that are 
out of date, inappropriate and that may 
promote practice that has become unsafe 
or inefficient.
 • Apply structured risk management principles and 
practice to developing SOPs
 • Treat SOPs as risk mitigation tools
 • Ensure that NMAS and other applicable 
legislation give IPs freedom to update SOPs 
as necessary in response to changes in IEDD 
design and tactics
 • Look for all opportunities to deal with IEDs 
remotely; minimise manual/human interaction 
with devices
 • Review SOPs whenever there is a significant 
change in IED design, tactics or the surrounding 
circumstances
 • Ensure that changes in SOPs are reflected in 
update training to affected operators and other 
staff
Human 
resources
Human resources remain at the centre of 
IEDD operations, even if sophisticated, 
remotely controlled assets are used. Not 
every person needs to be able to deal with 
every type of IED, but anyone dealing with 
an IED does need to be competent, and 
suitably supported/equipped to deal with 
that specific type of weapon, under the 
prevailing circumstances. Competence 
requirements should reflect the demands 
of operations within those parts of the 
operating envelope assessed as being 
appropriate and feasible for an IP to 
work in. Failure to specify competence 
requirements adequately can lead to:
 • Unnecessary and unacceptable risk 
to operators
 • Reduced quality of land/site release
 • Inefficient operations
 • Poor quality information gathering to 
support future improvements
 • Loss of credibility and reputation 
with authorities, donors and other 
important stakeholders
Over-specifying competence requirements 
can be as unhelpful as under-specifying. 
Over-specification may lead to:
 • Excessive cost demands that cannot 
be met
 • Donor disenchantment with the 
feasibility and sustainability of IEDD 
in general
 • Inability to assemble sufficient 
assets to deal with less demanding, 
but larger scale tasks 
 • Define competence requirements on the basis of 
tasks that are the highest priority, and that yield 
the greatest benefits
 • Do not demand competences that relate to 
unusual or rare activities that do not form part of 
normal operations
 • In the absence of agreed standards, apply normal 
QM principles and practice (as per IMAS 07.12) to 
defining minimum competence requirements in 
relation to specific activities within the operating 
envelope
 • Develop competence standards (national and or 
international) along the same lines as for EOD
 • Consider sharing specialist IEDD competences 
between implementing organisations if suitable 
staff are hard to recruit or unusually costly
 • Develop training management plans that satisfy 
specified competence needs, in light of the level 
of aptitude, skills and knowledge of trainees prior 
to start of training
 • Ensure that instructors are competent to deliver 
specified training to the required standard
 • Use ongoing monitoring (as per IMAS 07.40) to 
check the effectiveness of selection and training 
of staff
 • Apply effective improvement processes in 
response to any evidence of real or potential 
shortfalls in personnel competence
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Aspect Notes Mitigation
Equipment IEDD operations may require equipment 
of the simplest kind, from tools familiar 
to traditional MA, to highly specialised, 
sophisticated and expensive items (such 
as ECM). Equipment specifications 
should reflect the demands of planned 
operations within clearly understood areas 
of the operating envelope. Equipment 
that is unavailable (for export restriction 
reasons for instance) or that is prohibitively 
expensive should not be specified. If no 
other means of addressing a particular 
task, or types of task, can be found then 
the implication is that the task is not one 
that can be conducted by MA assets.
 • Identify equipment requirements based on 
defined scope of operations within operating 
envelope boundaries
 • Apply normal QM principles and practice (as per 
IMAS 07.12) to procurement of equipment for 
IEDD
 • Update supplier and price databases to ensure 
that operating organisations are aware of all 
options when considering appropriate responses 
to equipment requirements
 • Maintain awareness of the relationship between 
equipment availability, competence and the 
associated extent of the operating envelope
 • Consider all equipment options (including local 
manufacture) that can reduce the exposure of 
human operators to risk
 • Reflect new equipment aspects in training 
management plans
 • Do not over-specify equipment requirements 
 • Do not engage in IEDD activity if essential 
equipment is not available
Quality 
management
Quality is ‘the degree to which a service, 
product or output fulfils requirements’. 
Requirements for IEDD should be specified 
by authorities, customers, operating 
organisations and others as appropriate 
to the various processes and activities 
associated with IEDD. Where there is 
uncertainty about requirements, operators 
and other stakeholders should discuss, 
agree and document requirements. Many 
IEDD requirements are the same as, or 
similar to, those associated with traditional 
MA. In general terms, a QMS associated 
with IEDD need be little different from one 
associated with traditional MA activities. 
Many IPs will apply a QMS to embrace 
traditional MA and whatever aspects 
of IEDD appropriately fall within their 
operating envelope.
 • Apply normal external QM principles and practice 
as per IMAS 07.12, 07.30 and 07.40
 • Apply normal internal QM principles and practice 
as per IMAS 07.12, 07.30 and 07.40
 • Apply normal MA clearance requirement 
definitions to the release of open land
 • Be aware of issues relating to defining 
clearance requirements in structures; engage in 
transparent discussions with tasking authorities; 
document decisions about clearance, handover 
and acceptance requirements
 • Identify aspects of IEDD accreditation and field 
monitoring that require additional detail and 
source specialist knowledge where necessary to 
define those aspects
Technical and operational aspects36
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Learning and 
improvement
Within any management system (IMS, 
QMS, Risk management, Strategic 
planning, RBM) learning and improvement 
feedback loops are an essential feature. 
IED situations typically exhibit variation 
and change over time and between 
locations. It is essential that learning and 
improvement processes are developed and 
implemented on a continual basis, drawing 
on comprehensive up-to-date IM, within an 
effective QMS. Management of any non-
conformity, including accidents and near-
misses, and of identified opportunities for 
improvement, must be managed effectively 
and speedily. Any failure to do so can result 
in:
 • Operators, support staff and 
beneficiaries being placed at 
unnecessary risk
 • Inefficient and/or ineffective 
operations
 • Avoidable accidents
 • Place the utmost importance on the 
implementation of speedy and effective learning/
improvement feedback loops (a normal part of an 
effective QMS) 
 • Apply root cause analysis (RCA) processes in 
response to any accident or near miss
 • Apply IM of the highest order to understand 
the prevailing circumstances and conditions, 
including technical aspects of weapons 
encountered, and to understand and improve 
operational procedures and systems
 • Review and update IMAS 10.60 Reporting 
and investigation of demining incidents to 
encourage better analysis of root causes 
and implementation of effective corrective/
improvement actions
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LEGAL ISSUES
LAND TITLE AND LIABILITY ISSUES
Issues of land title have been of importance to the MA sector in the past, but the use of IEDs in urban areas, including 
inside residential properties, has brought the subject into sharper focus. A number of operating organisations 
have flagged up the significance of the question of who owns property when deciding how to respond to potential 
contamination. 
MA actors are mostly dealing with IEDs used as improvised landmines in areas where blow in-situ options remain 
available (if adequate explosives can be obtained), or are working on buildings that have already collapsed.50 Following 
combat, Peshmerga units clear intact, or relatively undamaged, high value structures such as power and water stations, 
as well as some residential property. Where property is privately owned attempts are made to contact owners before 
IEDD work starts in case a detonation occurs (as part of a planned demolition or as an inadvertent IED detonation). 
IKMAA reports a double agreement process. If the landlord/owner is present, then that person signs to confirm authority 
and agreement. If the owner is not present, then the local authority signs to confirm the need for the destruction (such 
as for public safety reasons).51
IKMAA illustrated the difficulties by describing a possible situation where the current ‘owner’ escaped with ISIS forces 
as they retreated. The house was destroyed, but that owner may return in future and go to court seeking compensation. 
Furthermore, the original owner might have been Kurdish, was displaced under the Saddam regime, and may now return 
and also seek compensation. Under such circumstances IKMAA sees the potential for an owner to pursue an NGO for 
compensation.
Peshmerga commanders are sensitive to the risk of compensation claims at a later date if an owner did not provide 
permission or could not be located. During periods of active hostility there is a general assumption that damage is 
inevitable (as is evident in any area that has been subject to fighting), but that after fighting finishes there is an increasing 
expectation that property will be protected and preserved as much as possible. The more time that passes after the 
end of the fighting the greater the expectation of protection and the greater the likelihood that an owner may seek 
compensation for damage.
PUBLIC AND EMPLOYEE SAFETY
MA actors have experience of managing public safety during search and clearance work. Operating in open countryside, 
clearing minefields outside villages and away from roads, usually offers an easier to control public safety situation than 
conducting an EOD spot task inside a populated town. 
MA actors have always been aware of their responsibilities to their workers and the general public. It is normal to 
maintain suitable insurance cover providing compensation in the event of loss of life, injury or damage to property. Many 
MA actors also maintain insurance cover relating to the legal costs associated with defending themselves in court. The 
presence of IEDs does not alter underlying issues of liability, but it may influence some aspects of the risk environment 
including:
 • by bringing MA actors into closer proximity with more valuable aspects of a potential private claimant’s life and 
affairs; and
 • by increasing the risk of death or injury to workers.
Many MA actors have engaged in clearance operations in the vicinity of operational civilian airports, and have gained 
experience of the public liaison requirements and wider thinking necessary when operating in such a complex 
environment. The main difference compared with traditional mine acton is that the increased prevalence of IEDs in built-
up areas is likely to make public safety issues a more common, and sometimes more challenging, requirement than has 
been the case for many organisations in the past.52
50  Such as MAG operations using mechanical systems to process rubble in Sinjar.
51  Meeting with IKMAA and iMMAP, Erbil, 28th August 2016.
52  Such as when large numbers of inquisitive local people want to see exactly what an IEDD operator is doing. Extensive and reliable support from local police is 
likely to be required under such circumstances.
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COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
The MA sector has experienced relatively few legal actions in relation to either worker or public injury. A number of 
factors have been significant:
 • Most MA actors (although not all) have had a good safety record in relation to their own staff; and
 • There have not always been easy routes available for potential claimants to take action.
One operating organisation raised the question of insurance cover, and the extent to which underwriters accept any 
extension of work that was previously under the umbrella of established mine action, extending into IEDD. Advice from 
the insurance industry is that, in addition to the differing level of risk presented by the technical specifics of the item in 
question and its stability – whether discharged/fired or not, whether past its shelf-life, etc. – another key area of concern 
for underwriters is the environment in which the work is being done.  This often has a greater impact on the potential for 
actual insurance claims than the work itself. 
At the moment, none of the differing types of work generate a particularly adverse claims experience when compared 
to the others. As a result, underwriters (within the insurance market at Lloyd’s of London) do not generally differentiate 
(in terms of cost or policy terms) between traditional demining operations or clearance of more contemporary IEDs. 
Underwriters tend to focus more on each client (and that client’s claims record) than differentiate between types of 
clearance work.  Their view is that proper risk management by the client will ultimately be key to reducing the exposure 
any given client has to generating claims, and that those clients undertaking particularly dangerous operations, or working 
in a more ’cavalier‘ manner, will be found out by adverse claims experiences.53
SUMMARY OF LEGAL RISKS AND MITIGATION OPTIONS
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Land and property title Uncertainty about ownership of property 
may reduce IEDD operator confidence 
about engaging in operations that could 
cause damage to structures. Poor decision-
making/ uncertainty could result in:
 • Claims for compensation against 
operators
 • ‘defensive’ task prioritisation
 • Increased costs
 • Delays to some operations
 • Increased insurance costs
 • Establishment of national policies 
relating to ‘permission to work’ on 
IEDD tasks where property damage 
may be a consequence
 • Liaison with local authorities
 • Appropriate efforts to identify and 
communicate with property owners
 • Local authority sign-off prior to work
 • Implementation of established 
handover/acceptance processes
 • Contractual/tasking indemnification (if 
appropriate)
Compensation MA actors may face claims for 
compensation arising from: 
 • damage to property 
 • injuries to civilian population 
members (during or after IEDD 
operations)
 • injuries to IEDD workers
 • Apply structured risk management 
principles and practice to all aspects 
of planning and delivery of IEDD-
related, planning, tasking, operations 
and supporting activities
 • Liaise with local military/police 
authorities to implement effective 
public safety measures during IEDD 
operations
 • Maintain appropriate liability 
insurance cover
53  Information provided by Bridge Insurance Brokers Ltd, 30th September 2016.
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Aspect Notes Mitigation
Insurance The insurance sector currently treats IEDD 
(within an MA context) as a variation on 
existing themes of responding to explosive 
hazards; surrounding circumstances and 
the level of insecurity are more significant 
drivers of premium levels. That could 
change if individual organisations were to 
present multiple claims for injury/death of 
operators.
 • Communicate with insurance 
providers
 • Apply structured risk management 
principles and practice to all aspects 
of planning and delivery of IEDD-
related, planning, tasking, operations 
and supporting activities
 • Maintain awareness of prevailing 
circumstances and conditions and 
be ready to suspend operations if 
necessary
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ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
The economic impacts of IEDs mirror many of those associated with landmines and ERW of the types encountered by 
MA organisations in mine action programmes around the world. The main differences are associated with the presence 
of IEDs in built-up areas. Landmines generally deny access to rural land, impacting on economic activities associated 
with access to that land, and create the well-understood direct impacts associated with victims. Unexploded ordnance 
has often been found in urban areas following fighting, but rarely with the victim-operated aspects associated with many 
IEDs. While UXO, especially submunitions, has given rise to victims amongst urban populations, they have rarely done 
so as part of a designed feature of the weapon. Victim operated IEDs do, of course, include a specific (and usually 
indiscriminate) design intent to be victim operated.
The nature of the impacts on victims (those directly killed or injured and their families) of landmines and UXO have been 
studied and, in many cases, quantified within various societies54. It is unlikely that the nature and severity of impacts 
arising from IED accidents will be significantly different, but it is possible that there will be more victims within those 
communities most directly affected by warfare involving IEDs.
COMPARATIVE COST OF IEDD
There appears to be a general assumption that humanitarian IEDD costs more than traditional MA. This is certainly 
the case under some circumstances, but it is not clear that dealing with IEDs used as landmines in open land (the 
primary focus of current MA operations) need be substantially more costly than similar operations against industrially 
manufactured landmines.
As with other aspects of IEDs and IEDD, there needs to be more precise use of language to differentiate between 
circumstances before attempting to ascribe costs. The cost of operating in relatively insecure areas is mostly driven by 
the cost of security measures, and is not unique to IEDD operations, although the need for ECM and other specialist 
technologies is a particular feature of IEDD operations in insecure areas.55
IEDD-specific additional costs could include:
 • Specialist equipment, such as disrupters;
 • Higher specialist personnel costs; and
 • Larger team sizes compared to a normal EOD spot task.
The cost of dealing with a complex device in an insecure area is likely to be significantly higher than dealing with the 
same device in a safe area, when there is confidence that the device is abandoned. Unit costs (per device, task or asset) 
are likely to increase, relative to other forms of mine action, as operations against more technically complex devices, 
emplaced in more difficult ways, under more demanding insecurity circumstances are considered. The costs of dealing 
with relatively simple devices, under relatively safe conditions, may be similar to those associated with traditional land 
release operations.
IEDD FUNDING SOURCES
Humanitarian IEDD operations in Iraq are funded through channels familiar to MA:
 • Donor grants to MA NGOs;
 • National government funding to MA authorities (IKMAA and DMA);
 • Commercial contracts (from PM/WRA and the UN) for humanitarian operations; and
 • Commercial contracts to support commercial operations (such as for RPS working with oil and gas companies).
54  For instance – Caring for Landmine Victims, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005.
55  MAG is content to deal with ‘abandoned’ or ‘legacy’ RC IEDs without the use of ECM on the basis of a risk assessment that provides adequate confidence that 
the task location is no longer active and that there is no one on the other end of the wire/link. The ability to QA risk management assessments and decisions 
may be an important mechanism to help maintain confidence in their validity.
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Additionally, in the context of northern Iraq, there is national government funding of specialist military units for non-
humanitarian, combat-related C-IED and IEDD. International governments provide military training and support assets to 
assist Iraqi Army and Peshmerga military units. The international military training teams have some interactions with MA 
actors.
ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
There is some evidence that funds that might previously have been allocated to legacy mine and UXO clearance 
operations are now being diverted towards IEDD projects. MAG reports that the overall level of funding for the 
organisation’s mine action and IEDD work in northern Iraq and north-eastern Syria has increased, but that the proportion 
of funding on ‘legacy’ tasks has reduced from 80% in 2013/14 to around 50% in 2016.
SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISKS AND MITIGATION OPTIONS
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Humanitarian costs The cost of addressing humanitarian needs 
is increased when people cannot or will not 
return to their homes. The real or perceived 
presence of IEDs may be a significant factor 
in reducing IDP confidence about their 
home locations.
 • Implement strategic planning 
processes in cooperation with high 
level humanitarian coordination focal 
points (clusters, sub-clusters, etc.)
 • Apply RBM principles and practice to 
identifying, prioritising and allocating 
MA IEDD tasks
 • Apply LR principles and practise to 
support release of as much high 
priority land as possible by the most 
efficient means
 • Implement effective RE and CL 
programmes
Allocation of funds Poor allocation of funds to equipment, 
capacities and tasks may result in:
 • Waste of time, money and resources
 • Ineffective and/or inefficient 
operations
 • Reductions in the benefits provided 
to affected populations
 • Reduced results, outcomes and 
impacts from MA IEDD
 • a loss of donor confidence in the 
provision of support for MA IEDD
 • Apply RBM principles and practice to 
identifying, prioritising and allocating 
MA IEDD tasks
 • Apply structured risk management 
approaches to identifying the most 
beneficial, effective and efficient 
aspects of IEDD for MA actors to 
address
 • Capability development driven 
by clearly defined, relevant and 
appropriate requirements
Donor engagement If some aspects of IEDD in the MA 
context are perceived to be inappropriate, 
excessively dangerous, poor value for 
money, or otherwise unjustified in MA 
terms, there is a risk that donors could 
disengage from the entire theme of IEDD 
activity.
 • Use consistent language and 
terminology to describe IEDs and 
IEDD operations that justifiably fall 
within MA
 • Communicate boundaries within the 
operating envelope and demonstrate 
capacities and competence to 
operate within those boundaries 
 • Apply transparent QM and risk 
management systems including 
appropriate learning and improvement 
processes
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Aspect Notes Mitigation
Legacy aspects The profile of IEDs and IEDD may be 
diverting funds away from pre-existing 
legacy issues that continue to have a 
significant, but more familiar, humanitarian 
impact. As and when the profile of IEDs 
and IEDD reduces (or itself becomes 
more familiar), there is no guarantee that 
attention, and funding, will be re-allocated 
to legacy issues.
 • Avoid treating IEDs as a standalone 
issue
 • Clarify and reflect those aspects of 
IEDD that fall within the remit of MA 
and IMAS 
 • Integrate IED and IEDD data into 
wider MA reporting including impacts
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
A number of potential pathways exist for IEDs to adversely affect the environment including:
 • Component materials entering soil, air and ground water during manufacture;
 • Toxic materials entering the human body during (forced/slave) manufacturing;
 • Leaching of toxic materials out of poorly constructed buried IEDs into soil and water (especially when used in 
very large numbers);
 • By delivering direct damage to buildings and infrastructure as part of a ‘scorched earth’ campaign during periods 
of defeat and retreat;
 • Through the use of IEDs to achieve intentional contamination of the environment;56
 • As a result of intentional or accidental detonation during IEDD operations damaging infrastructure; and
 • As indirect consequences of accidental damage to water and sewage treatment facilities and other infrastructure 
with direct environmental functions during IEDD operations.
Those pathways that fall under the control of ISIS and other similar groups are outside the scope of this study, other than 
to highlight their existence and recommend that post-liberation environmental risk assessments take them into account. 
Those that relate to IEDD are reflected to some extent in the current nervousness amongst some IEDD organisations 
about legal liability relating to property. The risk of unintended environmental consequences when IEDD action results 
in contamination of air, water or land, should be addressed through the same environmental risk assessment (ERA) and 
management processes that apply to normal MA, but:
 • Most MA operators are not used to working on high value public health related infrastructure; and
 • Existing MA environmental management systems (EMSs) are typically somewhat superficial, focusing on a 
limited number of common aspects associated with mine clearance work.
Liability relating to damage to privately owned property is a subject that merits careful attention, but the risk of wider 
environmental and public health consequences from poorly thought out IEDD actions at key public infrastructure 
locations would be of a higher order of magnitude. 
In KRG controlled areas of northern Iraq in 2016 it appears that action on high value public infrastructure is carried out by 
Peshmerga units, but it may be that, as the situation improves, there will be hope or expectation of greater involvement 
of MA actors in addressing such requirements.
SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND MITIGATION OPTIONS
Aspect Notes Mitigation
Environmental impact IEDD operations can adversely impact the 
environment through:
 • Emissions to air (OB/OD, as well as 
noise, ground shock, etc.)
 • Emissions to soil (leaching of IEDD 
toxic materials)
 • Emissions to water (leaching of 
toxic materials)
 • Damage to land, property and 
infrastructure 
 • Intentional acts 
 • Implementation by MA actors of 
effective environmental management 
systems (EMSs)
 • Consideration of environmental 
aspects at the strategic, tasking and 
planning levels
 • Effective community liaison
56  Such as at the al-Mishraq chemical plant north of Qayyara, southeast of Mosul .
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DISCUSSION
IEDD AS A LAND RELEASE PROCESS
The concept of land release applies to all areas where land is not used because of the presence (real or suspected) of 
explosive hazards. It includes survey and search methods, EOD spot task responses, battlefield area clearance (BAC) and 
landmine clearance, as well as, when appropriate, dealing with stockpiles and the consequences of stockpile explosions. 
It is not limited to rural land, but to any area where the presence of explosive hazards has an impact on an affected 
population.
The presence of IEDs (whether real or suspected) affects people in similar ways to any other sort of explosive hazard 
contamination. Principles of land release are applicable, including the release of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
through cancellation, using non-technical information, reduction in light of information gained through technical 
interventions, and following clearance.
IEDs used as landmines in open country offer a situation that is effectively identical to that presented by industrially 
manufactured landmines. IEDs inside buildings present a different technical challenge, but pose similar problems to 
affected people as is the case when there is widespread submunition contamination in a built-up area.
It has been suggested that dealing with potentially contaminated properties demands the development of different 
‘clearance’ standards, ranging from a quick look assessment through to full, intrusive (and expensive) clearance. The idea 
is that doing so would reflect, to some extent, the residual risk associated with the property when handed over. There 
are some clear parallels with the development of land release concepts. The first is that thinking along these lines is 
not new. In mine action it has long been clear that it is not possible to clear everywhere that might have mines or UXO 
– the money will never be available to do so, and it would, in any case, involve a lot of wasted time and effort. Various 
concepts of survey were developed over a period of many years, leading to the current application of NTS and TS and the 
associated categories of release – cancellation, reduction and clearance. There may be scope to adopt a similar approach 
to reflect different approaches to releasing structures from the possibility of IED contamination.
At the same time, it was recognised that clearing land is a three-dimensional problem, and that clearance should satisfy 
the demands of the intended follow-on land use. It is normal to define the depth to which clearance should take place 
and to accept that there may be the possibility of hazards remaining at a deeper depth. So clearing an area of landmines, 
submunitions and shallow UXO does not mean that a large unexploded bomb (UXB) is not still present. If the land use 
changes and justifies a search for UXB then it can be paid for at the time.
Similarly, when addressing an IED problem not everywhere will be contaminated. An analysis of non-technical and 
technical data is necessary to identify SHAs that can be ruled out (cancelled or reduced) or that justify their further 
identification as confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). CHAs are typically fenced and marked to discourage people from 
entering them. The same may well happen with individual buildings or parts of towns and villages awaiting later IED 
clearance. 
Decisions about when to devote clearance assets to an IED CHA can be driven by prioritisation processes along the 
same lines as are used for any mine action programme. Affected organisations (and in theory members of the public) are 
at liberty to buy-in clearance services if they do not wish to wait for humanitarian/governmental teams to be available – 
as is normal with energy, minerals and infrastructure corporations.
While some specific terminology may be useful, it is not clear that there is any need to develop new approaches to 
releasing structures, areas and locations contaminated by IEDs, rather than to continue using the same approaches 
adopted for other forms of mines and ERW . In Iraq, non-technical assessments of areas where IEDs may be present are 
called ‘threat impact assessments’ (TIAs), precisely to avoid calling them NTS. There are pragmatic reasons for doing so 
at the moment, but as a general principle the development of new language to describe the same processes would be 
better avoided.57
57  It is worth noting that NTS, as defined in IMAS , does not exclusively mean survey teams visiting villages to talk to people; it covers all aspects relating to the 
collection of data , from all sources, to support analysis and understanding of the nature and extent of contamination and its impacts on communities. How that 
data is collected (through desk top searches, field visits, interviews, database analysis, etc.) is dictated by the situation and the sources of data available. It is not 
clear that the IED environment in northern Iraq, or other affected countries and regions, demands anything different in terms of the non-technical response.
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Land is released on the basis of ‘all reasonable effort’ to confirm or discount the presence of hazards. Dealing with 
landmines and other ERW is a well-practised process, working from a substantial body of experience, knowledge and 
information. It is not always as efficient as it could be, but it generally errs on the side of caution. Areas contaminated by 
IEDs, especially built-up areas, present a less well understood situation, but there is no reason to think that responding to 
them will not be susceptible to the same principles that work with other forms of explosive hazard. Doing so will require 
the collection and analysis of data to reduce uncertainty and to increase confidence in what constitutes ‘all reasonable 
effort’ when applied to areas containing IEDs.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR IEDD
All management (including quality, safety and environmental management) is risk management in one form or another. 
Good risk management relies upon good information to support understanding, analysis and decision-making.
It is worth noting that military forces have spent billions of dollars over many years trying to collect and analyse data 
about IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq to improve their ability to respond. Despite doing so casualties from IEDs continued. 
While the parallels between the military’s engagement with IEDs and MA’s are not exact, it is indicative that the level 
of effort that needs to be applied to IM in an IED context may be greater (and smarter) than that traditionally applied to 
landmines and general unexploded ordnance.
It is clear that responses to IEDs will be unsafe and inefficient in the absence of information management of the highest 
order. It is not yet clear that the scope and quality of IM relating to IEDs in northern Iraq meets the necessary standards. 
If action is not taken to improve IM, and the way in which it supports risk and quality management (and especially 
improvement processes), then it is inevitable that there will be more injuries and deaths to MA workers.
The subject of information management in relation to IEDs and IEDD raises difficult questions about how to balance 
the need to share information, to support safe and efficient IEDD operations, with justifiable concerns that users of 
IEDs may learn too much if they gain access to shared information about IEDD. To some extent this is an issue that 
has already been overtaken by events – Kurdish and Iraqi military IEDD teams have long been in the habit of posting 
videos of their IEDD operations on You Tube. There is little doubt that ISIS tactics and IED designs have already been 
influenced by information gathered from such sources. While that does not mean that MA actors should stop worrying 
about security of information, it does mean that legitimate information sharing needs should not be wholly subordinated 
to fears about security.
Fears about security, as obstacles to effective information sharing, often prove secondary to more established issues 
associated with MA databases – the tendency for some authorities to demand information, but to be reluctant 
(sometimes forbidden) to provide information back to those who most need it. This is certainly not an issue exclusively 
associated with IEDs and IEDD, but it is an issue that has more serious consequences in an IED environment, than is 
the case in traditional MA. In other mine action programmes poor IM, including limited dissemination of analysis results 
to operators and planners, leads to inefficiency and waste. When IEDs are present, additional consequences of reduced 
safety, and increased accidents, are almost certain to occur.
Addressing issues of inadequate information management requires the urgent attention and coordinated efforts of all 
MA actors:
 • Authorities to find ways to share relevant information, including changing inappropriate information security 
policies and regulations;
 • Database managers, to develop suitable data collection forms, analysis tools and indicators;
 • Operating organisations to:
 ◦ Demand and help define better analysis and dissemination of results;
 ◦ Demonstrate appropriate internal procedures to control the distribution of potentially sensitive information;
 ◦ Emphasise to field operators the importance of collecting data of all types;
 ◦ Collect all relevant data relating to devices, tactics and surrounding circumstances; and
 ◦ Coordinate to share information if formal mechanisms are unavailable or unsuitable.
 • International institutions to maintain support to authorities and database managers to improve IM to adequate 
levels; and
 • Donors to support demands for, and be prepared to fund, improved IM.
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It is inevitable that some aspects of IM development will be slower than is desirable. Operating organisations cannot 
delay improvement in their own approach to information management just because other authorities are being slow. 
While it may be frustrating that data provided to some authorities appears to disappear without trace, that same data 
should be retained and used by operating organisations individually or in collaboration with other actors.
Effective risk management relies upon good information. IEDs and IEDD are entirely suitable for analysis and 
management using well established risk management methodologies. The MA sector has not been in the habit of 
carrying out structured risk management (using approaches commonly applied in other industries). When operating in 
IED environments, such as northern Iraq, failing to do so will lead to adverse consequences at every level, whether taking 
poor strategic policy decisions, misallocating priorities, tasks and funds, or allowing operators to apply inappropriate and 
potentially unsafe procedures. Failures may also represent fundamental breaches of mine action organisations’ duty of 
care to their workers, with knock-on legal consequences in the event of court action following an accident.
All options should be considered when identifying and assessing risk mitigation options remembering that selected 
actions may:
 • Avoid the risk (by not engaging in the hazardous activity);
 • Remove the source of the risk;
 • Reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of an adverse event;
 • Share the risk; and/or
 • Accept the risk.58
Prioritisation and land release are both risk management methodologies – prioritisation is effectively a decision that 
mitigation at a site is, or is not, necessary now or in the near future. Land release similarly seeks to identify land that 
does not justify technical interventions, leaving only areas that do require the early and active efforts of survey and 
clearance resources.
IEDD AND RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT (RBM)
IEDD is primarily a technical and operational process susceptible to quality management, on the basis of underlying 
risk and information management principles and systems, but no process takes place in isolation, as the introduction to 
IMAS 07.12 makes clear. Surrounding any operational process is the wider environment of intended results, outcomes 
and impacts, managed through application of RBM systems and principles. IEDD decisions need to be taken within a 
well understood RBM context.
Although much of the focus of IEDD discussions is on the fine detail of what types of IED are suitable for search and 
clearance action by MA actors, and the specific procedures, competences and equipment that should be used, none of 
those discussions, and the associated decisions, should be undertaken without careful consideration of wider questions 
of what needs to be done and why.
Decisions about what equipment and competences are required for certain types of IEDD presuppose that such types 
of IEDD are a priority. There is no point spending large sums of money, and taking a great deal of time to select, recruit 
and train specialist IEDD operators, if it turns out that the greatest humanitarian impact is associated with completely 
different types of device. The only way to gain a clear understanding about which impacts on affected communities are 
the greatest, and which are likely to yield the greatest benefits when addressed, is though application of effective RBM 
methods, supported by reliable IM.
Results-based management provides the framework in which strategic and operational planners and prioritisers should 
analyse situations and take decisions about the capabilities and capacities they need. The cost of clearing an IED used as 
a landmine, laid in a large barrier minefield, in open country, is likely to be very much less (possibly orders of magnitude 
less), than the cost of clearing a sophisticated IED hidden in a building or domestic appliance.
It is clear that any action to expand the boundaries of an organisation’s operating envelope will demand additional skills 
as well as equipment (in many cases) and, by extension, increased cost. There needs to be a very clear justification for 
such an expansion in capability, driven by the value, scale and relative priority of the benefits that should accrue from 
deploying that capability.
58  And remembering the important principle that mitiating one risk may give rise to new risks.
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LEARNING AND IMPROVEMENT
All effective management systems adopt a cyclical structure; one that ensures that experience and lessons learned 
during day-to-day activities, whether routine or out of the ordinary, positive or negative, are captured, analysed and used 
to improve future operations and decision-making.
The operational environment in northern Iraq is one that changes all the time. The business of IEDD is new to most MA 
actors, so every day of operations builds experience and knowledge. Over time, and from one area to another, device 
design and employment vary. The local political and security situation varies from place to place and from time to time.
In such an environment of constant change it is essential that feedback loops (that drive learning and improvement) work 
constantly, reliably and rapidly. It is not always clear that they are doing so. It is possible that some feedback loops are 
working reasonably well within individual organisations, although the study team saw evidence to suggest that, at least 
some of the time, they are not. At a wider programmatic level, it is equally important that there is collective learning and 
improvement. Difficulties with IM systems, restrictions on sharing of some information, and the distractions of doing 
a demanding job under demanding conditions, all conspire to reduce the effectiveness of learning and improvement 
processes.
One of the most significant occasions when improvement must take place comes when an accident occurs. It is 
inefficient, wasteful and fundamentally disrespectful to accident victims if the response to an accident is not thorough, 
objective, analytical and with wide distribution of the consequent recommendations for improvement. The study team 
had the opportunity to review one post-accident board of inquiry (BOI) report relating to an IEDD accident in northern 
Iraq. The document provided to the team was wholly inadequate, containing no meaningful root cause analysis, but rather 
presenting a number of guesses about what might have happened and making few recommendations for improvement.
The IEDD environment is an unforgiving one. Any shortcomings in the application of structured improvement/learning 
feedback loops within quality, safety and risk management systems will lead to further accidents, injuries and fatalities. 
Addressing such requirements lies within the authority and ability of individual MA organisations, supported by relevant 
authorities, is already covered by IMAS and is not dependent on decisions about the scope or terminology of IEDD in an 
MA context.
RELEVANT EXPERIENCE FROM MINE ACTION
Similarities
It is common in some quarters to view IEDD as a completely different subject to mine action, including EOD, offering 
utterly different challenges and requiring entirely new approaches. It is true that dealing with IEDs does offer some 
significantly different aspects, both in detail and at higher management and policy levels, but carrying out this study 
highlighted the extent to which almost all the basic concepts and principles of mine action remain applicable (although 
the detail of how they are applied may be different on some occasions). The key difference is that those principles, 
when applied to IEDs tend to be associated with events and activities that happen faster, more intensively, with greater 
consequences and exhibiting much more rapid change. 
MA actors always have to consider the operating envelope (the scope of circumstances and activities) within which 
they are prepared to work, irrespective of the country or type of contamination they face. In traditional MA the choices 
they make nowadays are informed by experience gained, and lessons learned, over the last 25 years and more. Most 
activities, and the weapons that are encountered, are relatively well understood, have been addressed before and 
offer low levels of uncertainty to authorities, planners and operators. Even then there are dimensions that need careful 
consideration – an organisation and its operators comfortable with finding and destroying unexploded hand grenades 
and mortar bombs is not generally as well prepared to address a fuelled up rocket or missile. If they do encounter such 
a requirement, they stop, consider the situation, discuss whether other better able organisations should address the 
task or whether there is a justifiable need for them to do so themselves. If so, they seek out the right expertise, procure 
specialist equipment, plan the operation carefully and only carry out the work when they are properly prepared to do so.
When dealing with IEDs the situation is the same, but the circumstances are less well understood, the weapons may 
be less easy to define, the situation may change often and rapidly and may be associated with wider issues of insecurity 
and potential proximity to conflict. There may also be huge humanitarian pressure along the lines of ‘something must 
be done’. Situations where organisations are much less well prepared than they are used to, combined with extreme 
pressure to find a way to do something, bring a wide range of risks at strategic, operational and technical levels.
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The closer IED operations are to traditional MA mine action (and some IEDD operations are very similar in many ways 
to traditional mine action) the lower the demands on information management, risk management , quality & safety 
management, and other features of the response. The further away from those circumstances operators choose to 
work (more insecure environments; more complex and challenging types of IED) the greater the demands and the more 
unforgiving the results of any failure or mistake. At this stage it is hard to quantify any relationship between increased 
challenges and increased management capability (and cost), but it is reasonable to say that the relationship is not a linear 
one – it is more likely to be exponential – a bit more challenge/capability implies a lot more ability/cost.
None of this means that MA should not become involved in aspects of IED contamination and response, but it does 
mean that there is a need for considered, reasoned, evidence-based, risk management thinking of a high order. Not 
every actor in mine action has demonstrated that level of strategic, planning and operational ‘thinking and doing’ ability in 
the past.
Early development of MA
Current circumstances present some parallels with the situation in the early 1990s as mine action established itself 
and took ownership of some (although not all) aspects of a discipline (mine clearance ) that had previously been almost 
exclusively military. Today MA is taking ownership of some aspects of the IED issue. In the same way that MA never 
took ownership of all aspects of what was then known as mine clearance (in particular combat mine clearance), so it is 
clear that mine action will never take ownership of the entirety of responses to IEDs.
The initial incursion of (what is now known as) MA was initially greeted with the greatest suspicion and some hostility 
by military forces. The prevailing view was that this was a military issue, best addressed by specially trained military 
operators, and best left well alone by civilian amateurs. By the second half of the 1990s perceptions had shifted 
dramatically; it became common for those same military units to ask MA NGOs for opportunities to expose military 
personnel to the realities of large scale mine action - something that most military units had not done on a substantial 
scale since the end of World War II (WWII ).
Much of the first several years of modern MA was taken up in acrimonious and sometimes interminable technical 
discussions about how, and whether, to move away from traditional military mine clearance procedures (three operators 
in a lane, lying on their stomachs for instance), through intermediate steps (two operators in a lane; one operator at the 
front of the lane, another sitting at the rear of the lane observing), until eventually procedures adapted to the humanitarian 
context (one operator working in the lane, in a position of comfort and ergonomic efficiency, with appropriate protective 
equipment), were adopted and widely accepted.
Should deminers do EOD ?
It is not often remembered that in the early 1990s there was an extended debate about whether ‘deminers’ should be 
allowed to engage in EOD . A number of individuals and organisations took the view that deminers should just clear 
mines. If they came across an item of UXO they should mark it, report it and leave it for a specialist explosive ordnance 
disposal team to arrive. There were suggestions that EOD was more complicated than demining and required a higher 
level of skill and knowledge than that required to deal with mines. 
The counter-argument was that it made no sense to demine an area of land, but then leave it containing other explosive 
hazards. In the end it was decided that the basic principle should be that a team should be able to deal with any of the 
devices it encountered during clearance operations, up to certain limits of weapon size, type and contents. Eventually 
standards were established for EOD competence levels. Today that argument is generally forgotten and most modern 
mine action actors would be astonished to hear that it had ever been seriously considered. It is well understood that 
some types of weapon fall outside the competence of a team leader to deal with. If such weapons are encountered, 
whether in the ground or in stockpiles, they are reported and decisions are taken about how best to respond. If a 
response is necessary, then a specialist team is assembled and appropriate equipment and procedures applied.
Technical focus
Modern MA was dominated by a technical focus for several years. Programmes were established on the basis of 
guesses about needs and responses to estimates of how many people, machines and dogs could be funded based on 
donor willingness to provide funds.
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After several years of operations, it became clear that a great deal of clearance work had taken placein areas where 
a) there weren’t any mines and/or b) the cleared land had not been put to any productive use or occupation. Over the 
following decade various attempts were made to bring a more balanced and informed approach to prioritising, tasking 
and planning operations. The results of those attempts included:
 • Greater emphasis on non-technical survey (including analysis of historical and operational data );
 • Linking mine action and development (LMAD) and subsequently adoption of results-based management (RBM) 
approaches; and
 • The concept and practice of land release.
There is some risk that current discussions about IEDD could fall into the same trap of starting the discussion from the 
‘sharp end’ of technical operations, rather than approaching it from the perspective of impact and need, before identifying 
suitable responses and the technical implications of implementing those responses. It took MA many years to re-set its 
perspective.
MA also faced some distortion of strategic thinking on the basis of significant overestimates of the scale of the landmine 
problem.59 The scale of the IED problem remains poorly defined, although evidence to date suggests that the largest 
numbers of devices are associated with mass-produced improvised landmines. Numbers of booby traps and command 
wire/radio controlled devices in urban areas should become clearer as more operations take place in liberated towns 
and villages, and as more data becomes available. Until such information does become available, it is hard to predict the 
relative levels of effort required to address different types of IED and the associated equipment, competence and cost 
implications.
IMPROVISED DEVICES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FIVE PILLARS OF MINE ACTION
 • Advocacy: Some types of improvised device fall under the umbrella of existing international humanitarian law 
(IHL) . The Ottawa Treaty is clear that an improvised device used as a landmine falls under the terms of the 
treaty as much as one manufactured in an industrial facility. Other types of improvised device are covered by the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The challenge to advocacy organisations is not so much 
the definition of weapon types, but the nature of the organisations using those weapons. Advocacy against 
landmines and cluster munitions has been strikingly successful when dealing with internationally recognised 
governments, but much harder to effect when dealing with entities that reject basic humanitarian principles as 
commonly understood by the international community.60 Advocacy against victim operated IEDs appears to be 
wholly consistent with established mine action advocacy practice and policies.
 • Victim assistance (VA): Victims of IEDs exhibit similar injuries and indirect effects on life chances, families and 
dependents to those resulting from landmines and other types of ERW . Established approaches to VA are likely 
to be wholly applicable and appropriate to assisting IED survivors and victims. HI is engaged in VA work in Iraq.
 • Risk education: MA actors are already applying RE principles and practice in communities at risk from IEDs. MA 
RE principles, adapted as is normal practice to the specific threat faced by communities, appear to be suitable for 
IED affected areas and populations. DDG and MAG are engaged in risk education operations in northern Iraq.
 • Stockpiles: Stockpiles of IED components are encountered by MA actors when working in liberated areas. 
They exhibit many of the same characteristics as have previously been associated with stockpiles of abandoned 
manufactured landmines.
 • Clearance: Clearance of IEDs has attracted the most attention during recent discussions. As discussed elsewhere 
in this study, a proportion of IEDs naturally exhibit characteristics associated with landmine or UXO contamination 
and can be addressed through application of normal land release principles. There have been some attempts to 
adopt different terminology for some aspects of response to IEDs (threat impact assessments instead of NTS, 
for instance), but there appear to be few obvious differences associated with releasing an area from the threat 
of landmines/UXO and that of IEDs. Definitions of clearance requirements have been identified as an aspect 
requiring further attention. Ensuring clarity amongst stakeholders about what is required and whether it has been 
achieved is not unique to IEDs, but has been an important aspect of MA survey and clearance standards and 
operations from the earliest days of the modern industry.
59  Initial estimates in Afghanistan were of 20 million landmines. Today, when the great majority of landmines have been found and dealt with, it appears that that 
total number will be in the hundreds of thousands.
60  Although the Afghan Taliban did reportedly say that “landmines are against humanity and the holy religion of Islam”.
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STANDARDS, TECHNICAL NOTES AND GUIDES
Discussions are ongoing in a number of forums about the most appropriate standards response to the need to increase 
confidence amongst MA stakeholders in terms of the acceptable scope and practice of IEDD. 
Some authorities and operators appear reluctant to take independent action before applicable standards are agreed 
and published. While there clearly are aspects of dealing with IEDs that are likely to benefit from further clarification 
within international and/or national standards, existing IMAS already address many fundamental issues relating to quality 
management and land release, that encompass 90% or more of the issues relevant to current day-to-day operations.
On the basis of this study key observations are:
 • The great majority of the IEDD work being carried out by MA operators in northern Iraq is similar in many ways to 
traditional mine clearance work. As such, most aspects of operations (site management, medical support, quality 
management, land release, etc.) are already addressed by existing IMAS . MA operators generally agree with this 
observation, but there is uncertainty at authority level about the extent to which adoption of existing standards is 
acceptable.
 • IMAS 01.10, the Guide for the application of IMAS, offers an opportunity to address some significant areas of 
uncertainty including:
 ◦ Circumstances and situations that include the presence of IEDs when it is appropriate to apply IMAS;
 ◦ The applicability of established QM approaches to IEDD (detailed in IMAS 07.12, 07.30 and 07.40);
 ◦ The applicability of land release methods to locations and areas contaminated with IEDs (as detailed in IMAS 
07.11, 08.10 and 08.20);
 ◦ The fundamental importance of IM to establishing, supporting, managing and conducting IEDD operations in 
an MA context; and
 ◦ The importance of adopting risk management and RBM perspectives within operational decision-making 
processes;
 • If IMAS 01.10 does not provide enough flexibility to address some aspects of the application of IMAS to IEDD, 
then there may be value in an IEDD-specific IMAS that focuses on those improvised devices that are effectively 
variations on weapon categories already familiar to MA actors – most obviously ILMs. Such an IMAS would:
 ◦ Give authorities confidence in the applicability of standards to specified types of weapons;
 ◦ Reassure donors about the appropriateness of MA operations against some improvised devices, under some 
circumstances;
 ◦ Highlight those aspects of existing IMAS that need to be applied to a high standard (sometimes higher than in 
traditional MA);
 ◦ Address aspects specific to improvised weapons (with some cross-over to aspects already relevant to anti-lift 
and other improvised aspects of traditional MA);
 ◦ Set out general considerations, in terms of personnel competence, equipment and procedures that would 
need to be addressed by any organisation considering clearance of potentially IED-contaminated structures;
 ◦ Define minimum data collection and reporting requirements;
 ◦ Encourage appropriate information sharing; and
 ◦ Help identify those aspects of IEDD that are likely to remain outside the scope of MA organisations.
 • IEDD aspects that are expected to fall outside the bounds of MA/IMAS (in relation to the complexity of devices 
and/or the nature of the surrounding circumstances) are already being addressed by authorities and agencies 
within the military/security sectors. As and when standards have been developed and are made available, MA 
operators should have the opportunity to adopt relevant sections and elements:
 • IEDD competence requirements merit further investigation, definition and promulgation, either through 
enhancement of existing EOD competence levels, or through a parallel or bolt-on set of IEDD-specific 
documents; and
 • The poor standard of the BOI report seen by the study team, suggests that a review and update of IMAS 10.60 
Safety & Occupational health – reporting and investigation of demining incidents is appropriate.
TNMAs may be a useful means of communicating some more detailed information about IEDD operations, such as 
criteria for assessing operating envelope boundaries, IED (and potentially other weapon types) risk assessments and 
technical aspects of IEDs encountered by MA operators.
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Other documentation (such as guides) may be useful in encouraging greater confidence in competence requirements 
and capabilities, but the primary means of establishing fine technical detail is likely to remain individual organisations’ 
SOPs.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. TERMINOLOGY
Conclusions
1.1. Discussions of IEDs and IEDD as they relate to MA continue to be hampered by different understandings of 
terminology and acronyms. Action to establish standardised lexicons by UNMAS are to be welcomed, but it may 
not be possible to achieve a complete match of military and humanitarian use of terminology (as is already the 
case with military and humanitarian mine clearance and EOD terminology).
1.2. The language of IEDs and IEDD has not yet been fully integrated with already existing humanitarian strategic 
planning, RBM and land release approaches. There is a continuing risk that some new terminology may be 
developed for use in an IED context when wholly appropriate terminology already exists in the MA sector.
Recommendations
 • Standardise terminology relating to IEDs and IEDD wherever possible. The UNMAS IED lexicon, as well as 
IMAS 04.10, should be used as the basis for MA discussions relating to IEDs and IEDD, and for the classification 
of IEDs and their key characteristics
 • Avoid developing new terminology to describe methods, processes and tools that are already adequately 
addressed in MA terminology
2. GENERAL APPROACH
Conclusions
2.1. IEDs are not entirely new, or different from other types of weapon encountered by MA; mine action actors 
have encountered wholly or partly improvised devices throughout the last 25 years. The circumstances in which 
IEDs are encountered may include areas where conflict has only recently concluded and where there may be 
lingering hostility from some elements; such circumstances are challenging and need to be handled carefully, 
but they are not substantially different from those found in a number of previous mine action programmes. MA 
actors have access to the knowledge, experience and ability to assess situations relating to IEDs, take decisions 
about what is, and what is not, appropriate to do.
2.2. Humanitarian IEDD applies many of the same principles and concepts that humanitarian mine action (MA) 
does, but with important operational and technical differences: IEDD demands a higher standard of application 
of information management (IM), risk management (RM), quality management (QM) (including identifying, 
planning and implementing appropriate and effective training, equipment, procedural and procurement 
responses), occupational health and safety management (OHSM), results-based management (RBM), 
operations management and strategic thinking than has often been necessary in traditional MA.
2.3. MA actors still show some shortfalls in application of those approaches to dealing with landmines and relatively 
straight-forward UXO; the consequences of such shortfalls in a traditional MA context are mostly limited to 
inefficiency and waste of time and money (although there may also be safety implications). The IED context, 
particularly in a potentially insecure environment, is much more unforgiving; similar shortfalls result in immediate 
safety consequences including death and injury to operators, as well as potentially wasting time and money.
2.4. Current discussions about IEDs and MA show some parallels with the situation in the early 1990s as the 
humanitarian sector took ownership of some (although not all) aspects of a discipline (mine clearance) that had 
previously been almost exclusively military. Similar issues arose when MA teams first started engaging in EOD. 
In every case, despite initial uncertainty, discussion led to a pragmatic and appropriate conclusion whereby MA 
actors deal with those weapons that have a humanitarian impact, under political and security circumstances 
that are acceptable, and which can be safely and effectively dealt with by technical teams. Weapons and 
situations that fall outside acceptable technical and circumstantial boundaries are dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis, through bought-in specialist services, specially developed in-house capabilities, or by allocation to other 
agencies with the necessary capabilities.
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Recommendations
 • Address IEDs under all five pillars of mine action Start from the assumption that existing MA methods and 
approaches including strategic planning, RBM, land release, QM and IM are applicable to almost all aspects of 
humanitarian IEDD
 • Adopt an enhanced approach to all normal aspects of information, risk and quality management
 • When assessing what IEDD activity is appropriate (considering circumstances, competence and equipment 
aspects), adopt a similar approach to that used when assessing complex EOD tasks
3. STRATEGY/POLICY
Conclusions
3.1. There is uncertainty at donor level about the scope of IEDD that is suitable and appropriate for funding, and the 
standards to which MA actors are engaged in IEDD operate. National authorities have similar concerns about 
how to define the scope of MA IEDD, how to ensure the competence of operating organisations and what 
standards to apply.
3.2. MA actors continue to be wary of engaging in operations that appear to compromise their declared neutral 
and independent status. At the same time, it is clear that ISIS are unlikely to see international organisations as 
anything other than potential targets. ISIS does not appear to have launched any direct attacks to date on MA 
actors.
3.3. There is a risk that discussions about IEDs and IEDD within the MA context are dominated by consideration 
of narrow technical detail, rather than starting from a strategic/RBM perspective, identifying humanitarian 
needs, assessing the additional MA capabilities necessary to address those needs, and only then focusing on 
the practical, technical, competence and logistic implications. There is an associated, and opposite, risk that 
important technical aspects can become lost to sight beneath broader strategic, economic and humanitarian 
considerations. An appropriate balance, remaining aware of interactions between, and implications of, needs 
and responses at different levels needs to be maintained within operating organisations and authorities at every 
management level. 
3.4. Operations by MA actors in areas where there is an overwhelming and urgent humanitarian imperative may 
come under great pressure that ‘something must be done’. MA actors may find it hard to balance the demands 
of an effective risk-based approach to operational decision-making with the pressure to help people in dire 
circumstances when other IEDD resources are unavailable or dedicated to other priorities.
3.5. The current high profile of IEDs has the potential to reduce awareness of other pre-existing landmine and ERW 
legacy issues.
Recommendations
 • Use strategic planning and RBM methods to develop as up-to-date and accurate as possible an understanding 
of the humanitarian context, to establish the most significant humanitarian impacts and needs relating to the 
presence of IEDs
 • Use RBM methods to provide a framework for decisions about IEDD policy, priorities and practice. Always 
question why a task is necessary, not just how to do it
 • Apply non-technical methods to identifying, collecting and analysing all data relevant to understanding the 
overall context
 • Be wary of assumptions made on the basis of limited data, or pressure to take action for the sake of being seen 
to do something;
 • Define the capabilities necessary to satisfy the main humanitarian needs, rather than look for needs that happen 
to align with possible/existing capabilities
 • Adopt a realistic and pragmatic approach – if skills or equipment necessary to develop certain capabilities are 
unlikely to be available then look for alternative approaches that are feasible, or accept that some capabilities 
may not be available
 • If the necessary capabilities are not available, then be prepared to reject tasks for which operators are not 
currently prepared/competent
 • Conduct further studies into improved use of the operating envelope tool in IEDD, EOD and land release 
contexts
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4. IMPACTS, NEEDS AND AFFECTED PEOPLE
Conclusions
4.1. The impacts of IEDs on affected populations are not yet well understood in either absolute or proportional 
terms. There is a risk that IEDD operations may be poorly selected, defined and prioritised if tasking decisions 
are not informed by RBM analysis. The scale of response to IEDs is likely to fall well short of the scale of the 
need/demand (as has often been the case in mine action programmes). Stakeholder expectations (amongst 
local authorities and affected communities) will be hard to satisfy in many cases. Inefficiencies in prioritisation 
and tasking processes may lead to stakeholder dissatisfaction and consequent disaffection and hostility towards 
MA actors.
4.2. Gender and diversity (G&D) aspects of IEDs and IEDD in the KRG region (and elsewhere) have not yet been 
explored in a structured way; landmines and general ERW typically have a direct impact on those who access 
land for work, travel or leisure, with an indirect impact on families, communities and economies. IEDs placed 
in houses and local infrastructure have a direct impact on all members of a family or community, irrespective of 
age, gender, ethnicity or other personal characteristics. 
4.3. There appear to be relationships between the ethnic and religious history of villages and zones with towns and 
cities and the likelihood that ISIS have used IEDs in residential properties. It is not clear that NTS systems are 
capturing relevant data to facilitate analysis.
Recommendations
 • Use RE and CL functions to assist with understanding of, and management of, affected people’s needs and 
expectations
 • Select, prioritise and allocate tasks that make a difference to affected people, rather than to keep available 
assets busy;
 • Collect sex and age disaggregated data (SADD)
 • Use NTS methods to improve understanding of ethnic and religious factors relating to the likelihood of IED use 
within inhabited areas and properties
5. TECHNICAL/OPERATIONAL
Conclusions
5.1. The IEDD ‘operating envelope’ can be considered in terms of a) the technical challenge presented by different 
IEDs and the tactics with which they are employed and b) the security environment within which operations 
against IEDs are carried out. 
5.2. MA actors encounter large numbers of IEDs used as landmines; they are not the only type, but it is important 
to develop and maintain capabilities to respond to what is being encountered, not what might theoretically be 
encountered.
5.3. In the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) area:
 ◦ MA actors are, for the main part, addressing activities that have parallels with traditional MA (open field 
clearance of belts of improvised landmines and some limited mechanical processing of rubble from 
collapsed buildings);
 ◦ Commercial operators are working in parts of the operating envelope that most humanitarian agencies 
would be uncomfortable about, including recently liberated areas where there may be a higher risk of 
attacks by ‘stay behind’ units, and against booby-trap IEDs in buildings; and
 ◦ Military/Peshmerga units work in the most challenging circumstances against the most challenging devices, 
including during ongoing fighting.
5.4. Responding to the problems presented by IEDs includes many aspects that can be addressed by MA actors 
(although with some additional equipment, training and procedural responses), but determining the boundaries 
of appropriate MA activities for individual organisations, operating in different areas, under a range of 
circumstances, and in light of the inconsistencies and changing nature of IEDs, remains a difficult and evolving 
task.
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5.5. Some activities carried out by MA actors are closer to the boundary of the humanitarian operating envelope 
than others; very careful consideration is required before ‘pushing the envelope’ especially in terms of the 
competence of field operators, supervisors and managers.
5.6. MA actors are generally avoiding the clearance of houses and other buildings suspected to contain IEDs. 
Traditional mine action equipment is inadequate for house clearance, which would require a range of specialist 
equipment (to locate/counter electronic elements of IEDs) and procedures, as well as a level of skill, knowledge 
and operational support generally unavailable outside military and security organisations (and in relatively short 
supply even within those agencies).
5.7. IEDD operations demand some different/additional equipment and competences (skills, aptitude and 
knowledge) from those associated with traditional mine action. Operating organisations need to ensure a mix of 
personnel, equipment and procedures, appropriate to the operational/threat circumstances and conditions they 
expect to encounter.
Recommendations
 • Apply established land release approaches to IEDD operations; adapt approaches, rather than developing new 
ones, if circumstances justify doing so
 • Drive IM systems to support an up-to-date understanding of weapon types and tactics within different operating 
areas and over time
 • Ensure that IEDD personnel recognise the collection of data (technical and non-technical) as a basic and 
constant part of their job function
 • Use the UNMAS IED lexicon as the basis for characterising different devices; collect and record data about 
every device that is found to support meaningful statistical analysis, trend identification, etc.
 • Gather data relating to the ageing/degradation of IEDs; ensure that analysis of data feeds into risk management 
decision-making processes
 • Conduct further research into the ageing and degradation of improvised devices, including the establishment of 
test areas for non-energetic components such as batteries
6. HUMAN RESOURCES
Conclusions
6.1. MA actors are finding it hard to identify, recruit and deploy personnel with existing IEDD experience and 
qualifications. 
6.2. There is uncertainty about the competence requirements associated with different IED types and working 
circumstances. There is no recognised set of requirements (comparable to those associated with EOD levels) to 
help MA actors recruit, train and monitor IEDD search and clearance staff. Advice from IED-experienced sources 
is inconsistent, placing different emphasis on operations in different parts of the operating envelope.
6.3. MA actors require competent operations managers and technical trainers, supported by an effective IMS, as 
well as field operators.
6.4. Personnel competence is primarily a QM issue, closely associated with risk management, relying upon a clear 
definition of required capability. MA actors may be able to establish such requirements in relation to some 
IEDD operations (such as those that exhibit close parallels with traditional land release work), but require further 
guidance in relation to more complex devices in more difficult circumstances (such as those associated with 
booby-trapped buildings).
Recommendations
 • Assess competence and equipment requirements in response to specific capability requirements. In the 
absence of IMAS or other standards, document analysis and definition of requirements, as well as of training 
and procurement responses to satisfying agreed requirements
 • Avoid trying to make everyone an expert; establish competence requirements appropriate to different jobs 
within the operating organisation (as deminers have different requirements from supervisors who have different 
requirements from operations managers)
 • Consider sharing advisers/trainers with specialist technical knowledge, as well as specialist equipment, 
between MA operating organisations
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7. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Conclusions
7.1. IED circumstances and conditions change quickly and often; operators need to be able to respond equally 
quickly if they are to remain safe, effective and efficient; doing so demands IM of the very highest order; 
evidence from the study mission suggests there are some gaps in the IM approach to addressing IEDs at 
the operational level (relating to the types of data collected, analysis and validation of that data, reporting and 
dissemination); there are also likely to be IM gaps at the strategic and prioritisation levels.
7.2. Security forces represent an important source of information about technical, tactical, social and geographical 
aspects of IED use. Establishing effective methods for information sharing with relevant military, police and 
security organisations will have a direct positive effect on planning, prioritisation safety, quality, efficiency and 
RBM aspects of humanitarian responses to IEDs.
Recommendations
 • Maintain a constant focus on IM in relation to all aspects of IEDs and IEDD operations
 • Adapt existing IMSs to the needs of IEDD rather than developing separate IMSs
 • Specify data collection requirements on the basis of what is needed to understand the situation, task, threat 
and performance of IEDD operations; don’t wait for IMSMA forms to catch up; find ways to manage information 
to support safe, effective and efficient operations
 • Maintain pressure on authorities and database owners to analyse data and share results
 • Establish informal information sharing networks if formal mechanisms are inadequate (while continuing to 
support improvements in formal mechanisms)
 • Do not wait for formal IM systems to be developed before collecting and analysing data
 • Establish linkages with military and security organisations to gain access to relevant non-technical and technical 
information and to encourage good practice (such as the recording/marking of areas and buildings that have 
been subject to search and IEDD).
8. RISK MANAGEMENT
Conclusions
8.1. The study team did not see evidence of widespread and comprehensive application of structured risk 
management thinking and processes to IED situation analysis and IEDD development. Informal risk 
management takes place in respect of some aspects of IEDD, but not in a consistent or fully evidence-based 
way, and not at every level of policy, planning and operations. Risk management practice is entirely applicable to 
all aspects of IEDD planning and operations and would provide a helpful structure for authorities, planners and 
operators to reach common understanding of the challenges they face and the responses they choose to apply.
8.2. It is not clear that decisions to conduct manual RSPs against large numbers of IEDs used as landmines have 
been taken into consideration of the normal hierarchy of safety risk mitigation measures. Further efforts to find 
alternative methods that reduce direct personnel exposure to IED risk are desirable. 
8.3. Decisions about equipment, procedures and competence requirements need to be based on an effective 
risk management approach, identifying and describing relevant risks, assessing and evaluating them, and 
establishing the mitigation measures necessary to bring risk to a tolerable level (normally one that is as low as 
reasonably practicable - ALARP).
Recommendations
 • Apply structured RM approaches to all aspects of understanding IEDs and IEDD. Maintain awareness of 
different risk mitigation options (avoiding, removing risk source, reducing likelihood and/or consequence, sharing 
risk, etc.) at all times. Review risk mitigation measures on a continual basis. Document all risk assessment, 
evaluation, mitigation and review in relation to IEDD
 • Treat the prevailing security situation and the technical challenges of different IED types as separate (but related) 
issues. Develop technical capabilities appropriate to the types of IED associated with the tasks that deliver 
the greatest humanitarian impact. Enable technical action through appropriate risk management measures in 
response to the prevailing security situation
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 • Consider opportunities to manage risk by delaying tasks, until the security situation improves (when the 
possibility of stay behind elements has reduced to a tolerable level), or IEDs are more likely to have become 
non-functional (as batteries lose power, etc.)
 • Always question whether better, safer options may be available for IEDD. Avoid exposing IEDD operators and 
support staff to risk unless a) the risk has already been mitigated to an acceptable level b) no other practicable 
technical method is available within an acceptable timescale and/or c) the importance of the task justifies it
9. QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Conclusions
9.1. Established MA QM approaches are wholly applicable to IEDD operations; specific detail needs to be agreed in 
relation to IEDD operator competence and building clearance requirements. 
9.2. The ability to manage improvement/learning cycles quickly and effectively is central to IEDD; accidents and near-
misses represent nonconformities of the greatest significance reflected in the additional, formal attention they 
receive through boards of inquiry (BOIs); an open, honest and transparent approach to investigating accidents 
involving IEDs is essential to avoid further accidents; evidence seen by the study team suggests there are 
significant weaknesses in the conduct of accident inquiries by some MA actors.
Recommendations
 • Apply existing QM approaches to all relevant aspects of IEDD. Existing IMAS requirements for internal and 
external QM systems and monitoring address the great majority of IEDD operations. Task-specific quality 
requirements should be documented in task orders, as is normal in MA. Additional or unusual aspects, such as 
when checking buildings, should be discussed, agreed and recorded by key stakeholders
 • The absence of an IEDD-specific IMAS does not prevent the application of normal QM processes, but reinforces 
the need for operators, authorities and donors, as appropriate, to record their analysis of requirements and 
methods to satisfy those requirements
10. LEGAL/LIABILITY
Conclusions
10.1. There is considerable uncertainty, at national authority level, and amongst some operating organisations about 
the liability implications of IEDD operations in residential properties.
10.2. In some cases, searching and clearing large numbers of houses may prove unjustifiably costly; in others IEDD 
operations may result in inadvertent or unavoidable damage to privately owned buildings; decisions to demolish 
buildings may give rise to complex and hard to define legal/liability issues.
10.3. Shortcomings in application of structured risk management approaches to the development of IEDD procedures 
and the selection and training of IEDD staff may leave MA actors exposed in the event of court action following 
accidents.
Recommendations
 • Include legal and liability issues in structured risk management processes and procedures
 • Document key decisions with potential legal/liability implications
 • Obtain counter-signatures from relevant authorities before engaging in any activity that may bring legal/liability 
consequences 
11. ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Conclusions
11.1. The real or feared presence of IEDs in liberated towns and villages presents both a direct hazard to returning 
people and a reason for them to stay in IDP camps where conditions are poor and where they may be 
susceptible to radicalisation. Populations remaining in IDP camps represent an additional burden on government 
budgets and their continued economic inactivity reduces government tax revenues.
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11.2. In the absence of reliable strategic/RBM analysis of IEDD needs there is a risk that funds will be inefficiently 
allocated, raising costs and reducing the benefits that accrue from humanitarian IEDD action.
11.3. A failure to demonstrate appropriate, effective and efficient use of funds could lead to donor disenchantment 
and disengagement from some aspects of IEDD.
11.4. IEDs may impact the environment through toxic materials entering soil and water sources, during manufacture 
of the weapons or while emplaced in the ground.
Recommendations
 • Apply RBM processes and procedures to ensure clear understanding of economic and financial context of IEDD 
operations
 • Apply effective environmental management procedures (in accordance with IMAS 10.70) to IEDD planning and 
operations
12. STANDARDS
Conclusions
12.1. Existing IMAS address many aspects of an operational response to IEDs.
12.2. There may be merit in developing a new IMAS to a) highlight the applicability of other available IMAS and b) to 
address any gaps in the standard system specific to IEDs; other action could be addressed through updating 
IMAS 01.10.
12.3. Strengthening of IMAS 10.60 Safety & Occupational health – reporting and investigation of demining incidents 
would support efforts to improve IEDD accident investigations.
12.4. Technical aspects specific to IEDs are likely to be best addressed using technical notes and standing operating 
procedures (SOPs).
12.5. Standards relating to IEDD that fall outside expected MA/IMAS boundaries are being developed by authorities 
and actors in the military/security sector.
Recommendations
 • Review and update IMAS 01.10 to provide clear guidance on the applicability of IMAS to humanitarian IEDD
 • Review other IMAS to identify adjustments to clarify applicability and ease application to situations where IEDs 
may be present
 • Consider the value of an IEDD-specific IMAS, highlighting relevant aspects of IMAS and their application in an 
IED environment
 • Review and improve IMAS 10.60 to include more focus on the analysis of data and conduct of root cause 
analysis to identify effective corrective/improvement actions
 • Review and develop as appropriate additional guidance on competence requirements through:
 ◦ Adjustments to existing EOD level specifications for those IEDs that can be treated along similar lines to 
landmines and some UXO
 ◦ IEDD specific specifications for those types of IED that require fundamentally different operational planning, 
support and practice
 • Identify standards in other sectors (security, military, etc.) that may be suitable under circumstances that fall 
outside those addressed by IMAS
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AGE 
Anti-Government Element
ALARP 
As low as reasonably practicable
APM 
Anti-Personnel Mine
APMBT  
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
AXO  
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
BAC 
Battlefield Area Clearance
BOI 
Board of Inquiry
CCW 
Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons
CHA 
Confirmed Hazardous Area
C-IED 
Counter IED
CL 
Community Liaison
CNIED 
Crush necklace IED
CP 
Contact point 
CWIED 
Command Wire IED
DAESH 
Transliteration of Arabic acronym 
for IS, ISIS, ISIL, etc.
DCA 
DanChurchAid
DDG 
Danish Deming Group
DF 
Direct fire
DMA 
Department for Mine Action (Iraq)
DoD 
Department of Defense (US)
ECM  
Electronic Counter Measures
EF 
Enemy forces
EFP 
Explosively Formed Projectile
EMS 
Environmental Management 
System
ERA 
Environmental Risk Assessment
EOD  
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW  
Explosive Remnant of War
FF  
Friendly forces
FSD  
Fondation Suisse de Déminage/
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
FP 
Firing Point
G&D 
Gender and diversity
GICHD 
Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining
HI 
Handicap International
HME 
Home-made explosive
IDF 
Indirect fire
IDP 
Internally Displaced Persons
IED 
Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD 
IED Disposal
IHL  
International Humanitarian Law
IKMAA  
Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action 
Authority
ILM  
Improvised Landmine
IM 
Information Management
iMMAP 
Information Management and 
Mine Action Programme
IMS 
Information Management System
IMAS  
International Mine Action 
Standards
IMSMA 
International management system 
for mine action
IP 
Implementing Partner
IR 
Infra-red
IRC 
International Rescue Committee
IS 
Islamic State
ISIL 
Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant
ISIS 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JGO 
Janus Global Operations
KRG  
Kurdistan Regional Government
LIS 
Landmine Impact Survey
LMAD 
Linking Mine Action and 
Development
LMM  
Locally Manufactured Munition
LOS 
Line of sight
LR 
Land Release
MA 
Mine action
MAG  
Mines Advisory Group
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MAP 
Mine Action Programme
MFA 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
MOI 
Ministry of the Interior
MoU 
Memorandum of Understanding
MRE 
Mine risk education
NGO  
Non-governmental organisation
NMAS 
National Mine Action Standards
NPA 
Norwegian People’s Aid
NSA 
Non -state actor
NTS 
Non-Technical Survey
OB/OD 
Open Burning/Open Detonation
OHSM 
Occupational health and safety 
management
PPE  
Personal protective equipment
PPIED 
Pressure Plate IED
PRIG 
Projected Recoilless Improvised 
Grenade
QA 
Quality Assurance
QM 
Quality Management
QMS 
Quality Management System
RA 
Risk Assessment
RBM 
Results-based management
R/C 
Radio Controlled 
RCA 
Root cause analysis 
RCIED 
Radio Controlled IED
RE 
Risk Education
RM 
Risk Management
RPS 
RPS Explosives Engineering 
Services
RSP 
Render Safe Procedure
SADD 
Sex and Age Disaggregated Data
SHA 
Suspected Hazardous Area
SIED 
Suicide IED
SOPs 
Standing Operating Procedures
SVBIED 
Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
TFM 
Technical Field Manager
TIA 
Threat Impact Assessment
TNMA 
Technical Note for Mine Action
TS 
Technical Survey
TWG  
Technical working group
TWIED 
Tripwire IED
UNDP 
UN Development Programme
UNDSS 
UN Department of Safety and 
Security
UNHCR  
UN High Commission for 
Refugees
UNMAS 
UN Mine Action Service
UNOCHA  
UN Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS 
UN Office for Project Services
UXB 
Unexploded Bomb
UXO 
Unexploded Ordnance
VA 
Victim Assistance
VOIED  
Victim Operated IED
PM/WRA 
Political Military/Weapons 
Reduction and Abatement (US 
State Department)
WWII 
World War II
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ANNEX A - A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF IEDs
There have been various methods of classifying types of IED over the last 50 years. Recent work by UNMAS to develop 
a standard lexicon of IEDs and IEDD reflects the types, categories and description adopted by military and humanitarian 
operators and authorities in a number of IED-affected countries. The UNMAS lexicon defines an IED as:
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic 
or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military 
stores, but is normally devised from non-military components. Refers to a type of IED incident that involves 
a complete functioning device.
IEDs may be ‘one-off’ devices, they may be fabricated to a common, repeated general design, or they may be 
locally manufactured in large numbers to a standard design. An IED usually consists of the following components: 
Power source – battery, spring, chemical, electricity main supply etc.
 
Switch – there can be 2 switches, a safe to arm switch and a firing switch, though a single firing switch can also be 
used. Switches can be anything – two pieces of wire twisted together, two pieces of wire which are separate, watches, 
clocks, tripwires, pressure plates, radios, mobile phones, light switches, micro-switches, infra-red passive devices, infra-
red active devices, light sensitive, match onto safety fuse etc.
IED Power source consisting of multiple batteries (of different sizes) 9V Battery used as IED power source in 
Kurdistan (image credit: FSD).
Pressure plate IED switch – Kurdistan (image credit: FSD). Light sensitive IED switch
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Initiator – for a high explosive device, a detonator of some sort, normally military, commercial or home-made. For low 
explosive, a match onto safety fuse, a modified flash bulb, a modified light bulb etc.
Main charge – for high explosive, military bulk explosive, military HE ordnance, commercial bulk explosive, home-made 
explosive (HME) etc. For low explosive, black powder, propellant, home-made explosive and so on. 
Electric detonator used as IED initiator Improvised initiator Kurdistan (image credit: FSD).
IED main charges in plastic containers – 
Kurdistan (image credit: FSD).
Locally manufactured metal cased IED main charges - Syria
Tripwire pull switch – Kurdistan (image credit: FSD). Pressure release switch – Kurdistan (image credit: FSD).
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Container – the item which houses the main charge or entire device.
There are 5 main groups of IEDs:
Time IEDs: designed to function after a pre-determined time delay, set by the user once the device has been constructed, 
emplaced and armed. Time initiation switches can utilise electronic, mechanical, igniferous61 or chemical means of 
initiation. Electronic timers have the potential to facilitate very long delays between emplacement and initiation, possibly 
up to several months, and are only limited by the discharge rate of the power source employed. Mechanical timers tend 
to give a shorter delay between emplacement and initiation, more likely to be measured in hours rather than days or 
longer. Igniferous methods of initiation normally employ a type of burning fuse, and the delay between emplacement 
and initiation is normally measured in minutes. Time devices are normally used by enemy forces (EF) to target patterns 
set by friendly forces (FF), or pre-determined events which occur within a known period of time.
Command IEDs: designed to function at the command of the user, ensuring it functions at the optimum moment of 
attack in order to maximize the targeted effect. Command devices can be initiated by a physical link (command wire or 
command pull) or by radio controlled (R/C) transmitters and receivers. The range of RC devices depends on the type of 
transmitter and receiver used. In order for an attack using a command device to be effective, the user, in most instances, 
needs a clear line of sight (LOS) from the firing point (FP) to the contact point (CP). This enables the user to choose the 
optimum moment of initiation, by ensuring that the target is in the immediate vicinity of the device, thus maximising 
device effect. However, it should be noted that this is not always the case, and ‘dickers’ may be used in this process. A 
‘dicker’ is someone who watches the IED and is in contact with the firer, and can tell the firer to attack.
Victim operated IEDs: designed to function due to an action by the intended target. They can be, for example, target 
pressure, pressure release, pull, anti-lift and infra-red (IR) signature. Victim operated devices are often indiscriminate, and 
therefore their emplacement can deny an area to all forces (including those on the same side as the user), and civilian 
communities.
Projected IEDs: can be used in the direct fire (DF) or indirect fire (IDF) role to deliver a projected main charge to a target. 
The most common types of main charges used are rockets and mortars, both conventional and improvised. Methods of 
initiation for projected devices are normally time or command, but can also be victim operated.
Suicide IEDs: suicide devices are carried to target, either by vehicle (SVBIED) or on foot (SIED), by the perpetrator. Upon 
reaching the target, the perpetrator initiates the device. Suicide devices are normally initiated at the command of the 
perpetrator carrying/driving the device. However, it is not uncommon for these devices to have multiple firing switches, 
including R/C and time back-up.
61  Igniferous means ‘produces fire’ and usually relates to safety fuse, lit at one end, and burning at a known rate until it reaches the initiator at the other end; the 
longer the fuse the longer the delay time.
Firing Switch 
Power source 
Arming Switch 
(Optional)
Initiator onto 
Main Charge 
Schematic layout of an IED (image credit: GICHD).
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CLASSIFICATION OF IEDs
The following table shows which types of IED come under which group.
Group Type of IED Comments
Time Electronic
Mechanical
Igniferous
Chemical
Can be target specific OR random in crowded area
Command (if both 
ends of command 
wire or pull wire are 
secured and wire is 
fully searched and 
confirmed as the 
same one could be 
dealt with by EOD 
level 3+ personnel)
Command wire (CWIED) Firer within line of sight or can use a dicker
Command pull Firer has to be close to target
Command (not 
suitable for disposal 
by non-IEDD 
personnel)
Radio controlled (RCIED) Radio or phone, garage door opener and similar
Firer within line of sight or can use a dicker
Victim operated 
(simple, non-
modified versions of 
these can be dealt 
with by EOD level 3+ 
personnel)
Pressure plate (PPIED) Can be classed as improvised landmine
Can be modified if patterns set, to delay disposal, to target 
unwary operator
Tripwire (TWIED) Can be classed as improvised booby trap
Can be modified if patterns set, to delay disposal, to target 
unwary operator
Crush necklace initiated IED 
(CNIED)
Can again be classed as improvised landmine, albeit with a 
different type of pressure initiated switch
Can be modified if patterns set, to delay disposal, to target 
unwary operator
Victim operated 
(not suitable for 
disposal by non-IEDD 
personnel)
This list is not 
exhaustive. Switches 
only limited by EF 
imagination
Infra-red passive Area burglar alarm, motion sensor
Infra-red active Burglar alarm for doors, windows etc.
Anti-lift Under any item, micro-switch
Tilt switch Under vehicle, in container etc. – mercury tilt switch, home-
made tilt switch
Pressure switch Under carpets, car tyre etc. Micro-switch, improvised matchbook 
and similar
Light sensitive Detect change in light levels
Magnetic Detect change in magnetic field, metallic items
Motion sensitive Detect ground tremors
Household switches
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Group Type of IED Comments
Projected Recoilless (projected 
recoilless improvised 
grenade (PRIG))
Shoulder launched, firing point detected by counterweight
Improvised hand grenade Thrown. Can have standard grenade type initiation (i.e. safety 
fuse to detonator) or improvised (e.g. micro-switch held in 
closed position by glass etc.)
Mortar (normally allocated 
model numbers for similar 
bombs)
Can be any calibre
Rocket (improvised types 
normally allocated model 
numbers for similar rockets)
Can be home-made or military rocket fired by improvised launch 
system
Explosively formed 
projectile (EFP)
Refers to main charge type but can be classed as projected
Suicide Vehicle borne (SVBIED) Usually hand-activated switch by person in car, often with back 
up time or R/C switch
Person borne (SIED) Usually hand activated switch by person carrying IED, often with 
back up time or R/C switch
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ANNEX B - AN OVERVIEW OF IEDD 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONS 
IN NORTHERN IRAQ
MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES
Peshmerga 
Initial encounter with IEDs at a given location is generally experienced by Peshmerga units (and Iraqi Army units in the 
south), including EOD teams. They address IEDs to the extent necessary to support ongoing military action – breaching 
fields of ILMs, dealing with devices impeding the movement of troops and clearing structures required for immediate 
military functions. 
The Peshmerga work in conflict areas, face very different circumstances to the NGOs and have to deal with very 
different problems. Peshmerga teams had little specific knowledge when first faced with IEDs, were aware of that lack 
of knowledge, recognised that they did not understand how the devices were constructed, but relied upon general 
experience with explosives and weapons, as well as the courage of their operators, to find and destroy IEDs. 
The Peshmerga ’s primary function is to make roads and access routes safe and to be ready to provide support during 
attacks on ISIS. Teams have to be very responsive and able to operate quickly so that areas can be taken from ISIS in 
as short a time as possible. One consequence is that the Peshmerga Engineer Regiment has suffered many casualties. 
The Peshmerga’s own tactics have been seen to influence ISIS IED tactics, particularly in terms of adopting unexpected 
attack routes into villages in open country.
The Peshmerga Engineers may be called on to operate anywhere along a 1,000 km front line with ISIS. That means 
that they need large numbers of trained staff, and trainers to train operators, but the reality is that they do not have the 
resources necessary for the scale of the task.62 The Peshmerga aim to clear houses of IEDs, rather than destroying them. 
Doing so already represents a major economic challenge, one that is likely to become larger as time goes on and more 
areas are liberated. Once the immediate conflict is over and ISIS forces have been ejected, their focus is not primarily on 
reconstruction or public safety, but on moving on to support the next military engagement. Peshmerga units do typically 
clear key infrastructure, such as power stations and public water supplies, but they do not have resources in sufficient 
numbers to engage in wider reconstruction/humanitarian clearance operations. Iraqi Army units perform similar functions 
in areas under their control.63
Coalition Military Forces
More than 150 specialist military trainers, from a number of nations (but mostly the UK), within the Coalition Forces, 
provide training and support to Peshmerga C-IED and IEDD teams. All IED courses carried out in the KRG area are 
sanctioned by the military HQ in Baghdad (Operation Inherent Resolve) to ensure the same programme of instruction 
across the whole of Iraq and Kurdistan. A centralised hub produces all training directives and has a set of terminology 
used in all locations in Arabic, to help ensure that one standard is being met. The primary aim of the courses is 
manoeuvre support – clearing villages and roads, with less focus on areas clearance. The preference is to mark areas and 
carry on with the battle.
Training courses focus on three main types of IED: time; command; and victim operated. Once the Peshmerga have 
moved through an area, time and command IEDs become less significant as a threat, so the residual threat facing 
villages is primarily one of VOIED.64
62  Discussions with Peshmerga senior Engineer Officer and Coalition Military Forces, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
63  The Iraqi Army are reported to have suffered hundreds of casualties during IEDD operations.
64  Discussion with Coalition Military Forces, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
Annex B - An overview of IEDD operators and operations in northern Iraq68
Commercial contractors
Commercial contracts have been issued for the provision of specialist IEDD services in Fallujah and Ramadi. Janus Global 
Operations (JGO) work in Ramadi; Optima in Fallujah.65 No commercial contracts have been issued for areas in the KRG 
region.
JGO teams focus on VOIEDs in permissive areas. JGO managers assess a range of criteria relating to the security 
situation, but one important one is for there to be a functioning police force in place. If the police are not comfortable 
going into an area, then JGO will not do so. There have been occasions when tasks have been refused, despite a positive 
security assessment from the tasking agency (UNDP), because local police will not accompany the IED team. JGO 
teams will not operate in areas other than permissive without a heavy security presence. Even in semi-permissive 
environments, where ISIS forces have been removed or are ‘under control’, and that may have been quiet for three or 
four months, there remains a chance of indirect fire (from mortars or rockets) or sniper attacks.66
Operations are associated with specific tasks – water treatment plants for instance – so most work is spot task in 
nature. When possible information is collected from police and military units to find out what has already been done and 
by whom. Areas already dealt with are a lower priority; the focus is on areas where the Army has not already been. The 
majority of devices discovered are VOIEDs, although some abandoned command wire devices have been found.
65  Janus Global Operations previously known as Sterling Global Operations.
66  Discussions with JGO senior field managers, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
Mosul
Anbar
Erbil
Slemani
Salah al-Din
Diyala
Kirkuk
Dahuk ¯
AREA OF OPERATION FOR IED CLEARANCE BY ORGANIZATIONS
16 August 2016
1
14Province District Organization Number of Completion
Hawija IKMAA 1
Daquq FSD 14
Telafar 346
Mosul 3
Sinjar 72
436
Kirkuk
Ninewa MAG
Number of Completion Reports by 
Organization Per District
Total
3
Kurdish controlled countryside
Gray Area
Iraq Controlled countryside
346
72
Figure 12. MA organisation operating areas, and number of task completions, as at August 
16th 2016. information provided by iMMAP (image credit: iMMAP).
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JGO managers take the view that ”you need to understand your limitations and never approach a device that falls 
outside your capabilities”. Situations where there is a live IED can give rise to ‘something must be done’ pressure. ”JGO 
apply a cool-out period with stringent pre-planning before taking action”.67 One implication is that stakeholder expectations 
(including those of donors) should not be set too high. JGO have been told they are going too slow on occasions, but the 
company points out that there is no data against which performance can be compared. JGO expects to be involved in 
work in Mosul , following its liberation (as well as into other liberated areas in Iraq). JGO receives its assignments from 
UNDP, rather than UNMAS. 
MA organisations
In the Kurdish regions, a number of MA NGOs engage with the IED issue: initially MAG and FSD , as well as IKMAA, but 
with DDG , HI and NPA in the process of preparing to start operations in due course. 
OVERALL ORGANISATIONS’ ACTIVITIES IN THE GRAY AREA
Organisation name
Number 
of entered 
hazards
Number 
of entered 
completion 
reports
Number of 
destroyed 
devices per 
completion 
reports
Number of 
entered NTS 
reports
Number of 
entered MRE 
reports
Number of 
beneficiaries
Danish Demining 
Group (DDG) 0 0 0 0 44 12,742
RPS 6 0 0 0 0 0
FSD 14 14 194 4 0 0
Handicap International 
(France) 48 0 0 50 0 0
IKMAA 1 1 98 0 0 0
Mines Advisory Group 441 421 2,409 0 345 7,597
Total 510 436 2,701 54 389 20,339
Table 1. MA actors activity levels in grey areas (to August 2016), information provided by iMMAP
IKMAA
IKMAA (Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority) has both a coordinating role in respect of IEDs and conducts some field 
operations using its own staff. IKMAA is suffering from delays and shortfalls in government budget disbursement, but 
is under pressure to support the various needs to help displaced people return to their homes and support the regional 
government as it seeks to push ISIS back. Following an accident in 2015 when four IKMAA staff members died while 
conducting a house clearance, IKMAA now applies a policy of open area IEDD work only.
MAG 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) is the largest mine action organisation in northern Iraq. The programme addresses 
contamination from previous hostilities ('legacy contamination') as well as humanitarian response to the current conflict. 
Around 26% of current capacity conducts legacy contamination clearance relating to the pre-existing landmine and UXO 
problem. 
The current humanitarian response operations started in 2015 with risk education, followed by a scale-up of survey and 
clearance capacity in 2016. The majority of devices cleared to date in area where active hostilities have ceased have been 
improvised landmines in open areas. MAG uses both manual and mechanical assets for technical survey and clearance of 
improvised landmines. MAG has also worked in and around villages to address victim operated and abandoned devices, 
and has conducted mechanical processing of rubble in Sinjar. 
67  Discussions with JGO senior field managers, Erbil, 30th August 2016.
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Prioritisation approaches are evolving as new areas become accessible and the scale of humanitarian need is defined. 
A key difference from previous interventions is that there is not a clear divide between conflict and post-conflict. MAG 
has put in place an approach that meets humanitarian need in areas where active hostilities have ceased. MAG has 
consistently stressed the importance of clarity around terminology used to discuss IED and landmine issues, as well 
as the need for contextual assessment and the importance of a clear separating humanitarian action from military and 
security objectives.
FSD 
FSD (Fondation Suisse de Déminage) is the other main practical IEDD operator within the MA sector, although its 
operations are on a lesser scale than MAG’s. The organisation also does not have the legacy of more than 20 years 
of operations in the KRG area. Initial tasks were managed close together, to ensure easy access between sites for 
international staff, and contained targets that were relatively straightforward while being challenging enough to put in 
practice what had been taught. FSD is now at a stage where it is feasible to split teams and send them to separated 
tasks.
FSD recognises that it cannot offer a complete solution (addressing buildings as well as open ground) to a community. 
When teams leave an area the surroundings are clear, but not buildings. Community liaison (CL) communication channels 
are important, but, because of proximity to front line areas, people are not living in villages now. Political tensions in 
liberated areas compound questions about who will return and when.
FSD recognises the need to clear buildings and aspires to doing so (although they haven’t done so to date). Many 
buildings are collapsed, so FSD would like to use machines to move debris, spread it, check it, deal with suspicious 
items, and continue until building foundations have been reached.
DDG 
DDG ’s (Danish Demining Group) position is similar to that of MAG , in terms of acceptable tasking. The organisation is 
happy to be involved in clearance of ILM , particularly in rural areas, but is less inclined to respond in urban zones, and is 
not set up to deal with mitigation of rubble, collapsed buildings, etc. 
HI
The HI (Handicap International) team have first-hand experience of dealing with IEDs, including ILMs , in Colombia . HI 
has been engaged in victim assistance (VA) and risk education (RE). The organisation takes the view that ‘anything to 
do with weapons affecting civilians should be tackled by MA operators, irrespective of the type of weapon’. If there is a 
need to release land, then there is a need to deal with the whole problem.
HI intends to engage in field IEDD operations. It wants to proceed cautiously, starting in open areas, then dealing with 
spaces between buildings, and then, when confident, working inside houses. House clearance requires more time, 
higher levels of competence and costs more money. The ability to establish such operations implies that donors will need 
to accept longer term commitments, to allow enough time to develop suitable capacities. HI is engaged in recruiting 
international staff and developing SOPs.
NPA
NPA (Norwegian People’s Aid) is responding to a request from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to look into 
operations against ILMs. Non-mine action elements of NPA are focusing on the relief side of humanitarian interventions, 
with particular emphasis on isolated and hard to reach groups.
NPA have carried out an initial assessment looking at areas in the KRG region liberated from ISIS. On the basis of 
MAG’s operations and the scale of the need, NPA has been accredited and as of January 2017 they have started manual 
clearance operations south-east of Mosul.
Within 2017 NPA will expand with ESD teams as well as NTS teams and conduct assessments on the use of machines 
and dogs for future operations with a view to restoring safe access for IDPs.
The need for NPA’s Conflict Preparedness and Protection (CPP) programming has been assessed as a vital component to 
returnees’ safety and will be implemented in 2017.
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ANNEX C - PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS
ORGANISATIONS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE STUDY
Government and Military
Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) (Government of Iraq)
Ministry of Interior (Kurdish Regional Government)
Peshmerga
Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)
British Army 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Handicap International (HI)
Danish Demining Group (DDG)
DanChurchAid (DCA)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Commercial organisations
Janus Global Operations (JGO)
Optima
Bridge Insurance Brokers
Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining 
Maison de la paix, Tower 3 
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2C 
PO Box 1300 
CH – 1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland 
info@gichd.org
Follow us on
gichd.org 
facebook 
twitter 
linkedin 
youtube
